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First Impressions 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression 
identified by a federal court of appeals opinion announced between 
February 1, 2006 and August 31, 2006.  This collection is organized by 
circuit. 
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief analysis 
and the court’s conclusion.  It is intended to give only the briefest 
synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive analysis.  
This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will hopefully 
serve the reader well as a reference starting point.   
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FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
Ruggieri v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 454 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an agency triggers the Whistleblower 
Protection Act by ‘fail[ing] to take . . . a personnel action,’ 5 U.S.C. § 
2302(b)(8), when the agency declines to hire an applicant pursuant to a 
vacancy announcement, but instead of hiring a different person cancels 
the vacancy announcement and hires no one for the position at that 
time.” Id. at 1325. 
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ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the Whistleblower Protection 
Act “provides that an appointment is a personnel action and that a failure 
to make an appointment is a trigger for an Individual Right of Action 
appeal.” Id. at 1326. The agency’s cancellation of the vacancy 
announcement and failure to hire anyone for the position “is sufficient, 
under the plain language of the statute, to constitute a ‘fail[ure] to take     
. . . a personnel action.’” Id. at 1326-27. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the applicant’s 
“evidence regarding his nonselection for the position of electrical 
engineer was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that an appellant in an 
Individual Right of Action appeal make a nonfrivolous allegation that the 
agency has failed to take a personnel action.” Id. at 1327. 
 
Jentoft v. United States, 450 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a dual status [National Guard] technician 
could be considered a ‘civilian’ employee for purposes of the Equal Pay 
Act.” Id. at 1345. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the language of the Equal Pay Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 216(d)(1), which proscribes an employer from paying wages 
to an employee at a rate less than that which it pays employees of the 
opposite sex for “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires 
equal skill, effort, and responsibility.” Id. at 1348. Further, the court 
noted that for purposes of § 216, an employee can be “any individual 
employed by the Government of the United States . . . as a civilian in the 
military departments (as defined in section 102 of Title 5).” Id. The court 
observed that “neither party . . . contests that [appellant] was a dual status 
National Guard technician,” and that the National Guard Technician Act 
§ 709(b) states “a dual status technician position is ‘defined’ under [10 
U.S.C.] § 10216(a),” and finally that § 10261(a) “provides ‘[f]or 
purposes of this section and any other provision of law, a military 
technician (dual status) is a Federal civilian employee.’” Id. Thus, the 
court found that “the plain language of § 10216(a) makes clear that 
[appellant] has a justiciable claim under the Equal Pay Act.” Id. The 
court further noted that “given the plain language of § 10216(a), we have 
no discretion not to adjudicate [appellant’s] rights under the Equal Pay 
Act, even under the Feres [v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)]  
doctrine . . . .” Id. at 1349. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit held that the Claims Court 
“erred in determining that [appellant] was not a federal civilian employee 
for the purpose of the Equal Pay Act.” Id. at 1343. 
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Hinck v. United States, 446 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Court of Federal Claims has 
jurisdiction over [Internal Revenue Code, 18 U.S.C.] § 6404(e)(1) 
interest abatement decisions.” Id. at 1310. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[p]rior to 1996, several courts had 
held that district courts had subject matter jurisdiction over § 6404(e)(1) 
claims, but that the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) barred 
judicial review of those claims.” Id. Furthermore, “[s]ubsequent to the 
[enactment of § 6404(h) granting jurisdiction to the Tax Courts in 1996], 
. . . courts considering that same issue have not been in agreement.” Id. at 
1311. The court analyzed the statute’s language and legislative history 
and concluded that “[b]ecause § 6404(h) provides a specific procedure 
for reviewing IRS determinations of interest abatement, specifies that the 
proper forum for those reviews is the Tax Court, and grants the Tax 
Court the power to issue an abatement . . . Congress intended the Tax 
Court to be the sole forum in which denials of interest abatement claims 
may be challenged.” Id. at 1314. The court further rejected the 5th 
Circuit’s argument against “constru[ing] differently a statute that is clear 
on its face.” Id. at 1316. 
CONCLUSION: The Federal Circuit determined “that § 6404(h) 
grants exclusive subject matter jurisdiction to the Tax Court to review 
the IRS’s denials of interest abatement.” Id.  
 
In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a determination that a trade dress is a product 
design is a legal or factual determination. Id. at 959. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that the answer to such a question 
is similar to the process of determining whether a trademark is 
“inherently distinctive” and “whether a mark is descriptive,” both of 
which are factual determinations. Id. The court noted that these sorts of 
determination have to be ones of fact, as they are based on customer 
perception and “based on testimony, surveys, and other evidence.” Id. at 
960.  
CONCLUSION: The court found that a trade dress product design is 
a factual determination. Id. at 959. 
 
Intel Corp. v. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org., 455 F.3d 
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether business negotiations with an agency of a 
foreign state, which do not result in a binding contract, qualify as 
“commercial activity,” making the foreign agency immune to the 
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jurisdiction of the United States courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) in a 
declaratory judgment action. Id. at 1369. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined the legislative history of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1603(d), which creates an exception to the sovereign immunity of a 
foreign state in a suit based on commercial activity, and noted that the 
drafters contemplated granting the courts wide latitude in interpreting the 
meaning of “commercial activity” under the statute. Id. at 1370. Relying 
on a Supreme Court interpretation of another immunity statute, § 
1605(a)(2), the court adopted the principle that the exception to 
sovereign immunity applied when the foreign state exercised powers that 
private individuals could also use. Id. The court also held that even an 
unconsummated contract could constitute commercial activity under § 
1603(d). Id. Finally, the court held that this declaratory judgment action 
could be considered “based on” commercial activity because the 
evidence of commercial activity would be used to support elements of 
the claim. Id. at 1371. 
CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the district court’s judgment that 
the foreign agency defendant was not entitled to immunity. Id. 
 
D.C. CIRCUIT 
 
Abigail Alliance v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Due Process Clause protects the right 
of terminally ill patients to decide, without FDA interference, whether to 
assume the risks of using potentially life-saving investigational new 
drugs that the FDA has yet to approve . . . but . . . are safe enough for 
further testing on a substantial number of human beings.” Id. at 472. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “the right at issue, carefully 
described, is the right of a mentally competent, terminally ill adult 
patient to access potentially life-saving post-Phase I investigational 
drugs, upon a doctor’s advice, even where that medication carries risks 
for the patient.” Id. The court found that “upon examining ‘our Nation’s 
history, legal traditions, and practices,’ that the government has not 
blocked access to new drugs throughout the greater part of our Nation’s 
history.” Id. Furthermore, “the right claimed by [appellants] can be 
inferred from the Court’s conclusion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), that an individual has a 
due process right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.” Id. The 
court noted that “here, the claim implicates a similar right . . . to access 
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potentially life-sustaining medication where there are no alternative 
government-approved treatment options.” Id.  
CONCLUSION: The D.C. Circuit held that “[w]here there are no 
alternative government-approved treatment options, a terminally ill, 
mentally competent adult patient’s informed access to potentially life-
saving investigational new drugs determined by the FDA after Phase I 
trials to be sufficiently safe for expanded human trials warrants 
protection under the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 486. 
 
NRDC v. EPA, No. 04-1438, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22074 (D.C. Cir. 
Aug. 29, 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “decisions” made by an international 
committee under the Montreal Protocol after the passage of the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 2399, 
2648 are enforceable as law in the United States. Id. at *21. 
ANALYSIS: The Natural Resource Defense Council (“NRDC”) 
claimed that the EPA rules violated the post-ratification agreements of 
the Montreal Protocol. Id. at *18. The court determined that “NRDC’s 
interpretation raises significant constitutional problems. If the ‘decisions’ 
are ‘law’—enforceable in federal court like statutes or legislative rules—
then Congress either has delegated lawmaking authority to an 
international body or authorized amendments to a treaty without 
presidential signature or Senate ratification, in violation of Article II of 
the Constitution.” Id. at *20. The court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court 
has not determined whether decisions of an international body created by 
treaty are judicially enforceable.” Id. The court compared this situation to 
the establishment of the International Court of Justice, noting that “[i]n 
Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 
F.2d 929. 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988), we held that rulings of the ICJ do not 
provide ‘substantive legal standards for reviewing agency actions,’ 
because the rulings, though authorized by the ratified treaty, were not 
themselves self-executing treaties.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “[w]ithout congressional 
action . . . side agreements reached after a treaty has been ratified are not 
the law of the land; they are enforceable not through the federal courts, 
but through international negotiations.” Id. at *26. 
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FIRST CIRCUIT 
 
Senior v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: The court construed the standard it should employ 
when modifying “labor agreements [that provide] for vested lifetime 
dental plan benefits.” Id. at 207. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that an unambiguous contract “must be 
enforced according to its terms, under both the common law and labor 
law.” Id. at 219. Ambiguity, the court explained, “is generally a question 
of law for the judge, and is subject to de novo review.” Id. The court 
noted the Supreme Court’s instruction that if a court finds ambiguity in a 
labor agreement, “it is necessary to consider the scope of other related 
collective bargaining agreements, as well as the practice, usage, and 
customs pertaining to such agreements.” Id. at 220. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that it must examine “related 
agreements, the practices in the company, and the custom and usage as to 
retiree dental benefits” in order to determine whether those benefits have 
been vested and whether they are subject to change. Id. at 221. 
 
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “officers of the State, acting pursuant to an 
otherwise valid search warrant, [may] enter upon tribal lands and seize 
contraband (in this case, unstamped, untaxed cigarettes) owned by the 
Tribe and held by it for sale to the general public.” Id. at 18. 
ANALYSIS: The resolution of a land dispute between the 
Narragansett Indian Tribe and the State of Rhode Island entailed an 
agreement (“the J-Mem”) under which the Tribe received a tract of land 
from the State, and the Tribe agreed that “all laws of the State of Rhode 
Island shall be in full force and effect on the settlement lands.” Id. at 19. 
Rhode Island agreed to exempt the Tribe’s land from local taxation. Id. 
Thereafter, Congress passed the Settlement Act, which put the terms of 
the agreement into law. Id. 
Rhode Island has a cigarette tax scheme that includes a special 
excise tax requiring the vendor to purchase a special stamp and affix it to 
every cigarette pack. Id. at 20. Any pack without such a stamp is 
considered contraband in Rhode Island. Id. The Tribe opened a cigarette 
shop on its lands, but did not comply with any of the tax laws for its 
cigarettes, which it sold to the general public. Id. Pursuant to a search 
warrant issued by a Rhode Island state court, the state police raided the 
Tribe’s shop and seized the contraband cigarettes. Id. 
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The court found that in light of the history of the negotiations 
surrounding the J-Mem and the Settlement Act, the Tribe’s concession 
allowing Rhode Island laws to be enforced on its land was an essential 
part of the consideration Rhode Island received in exchange for its grant 
of lands to the Tribe. Id. at 22. The court held that in both the J-Mem and 
the Settlement Act, the Tribe explicitly waived its sovereign immunity 
from Rhode Island law. Id. at 25. The court found Rhode Island free to 
enforce its laws on Tribal property absent federal preemption, which the 
court did not find here. Id. at 23. 
CONCLUSION: Essentially, “the J-Mem and the Settlement Act 
authorized state officers to enter the settlement lands and execute a 
search warrant as part of the enforcement of the State’s cigarette tax 
scheme.” Id. at 31. 
 
United States v. Leja, 448 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s failure to personally sign a jury 
waiver constituted reversible error. Id. at 88. 
ANALYSIS: The record showed that even though the defendant did 
not sign his jury waiver, his lawyer had signed the waiver, he was 
present when the judge discussed waiving the jury, and the defendant 
assented to the jury waiver by facial expressions after the judge had fully 
explained the ramifications of the waiver. Id. at 89-91. The court noted 
that although the Bench Book for Federal District Court Judges makes a 
defendant’s signature mandatory, the Bench Book is not binding law, and 
the controlling federal provision, FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a), does not 
address the matter. Id. at 93. The court found the jury waiver valid, 
emphasizing the defendant’s business sophistication and college 
education, as well as the defendant’s active involvement in his own 
defense. Id. at 94-95. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that because the “defendant 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial    
. . . the errors committed do not warrant reversal of the conviction.” Id. at 
96. 
 
Furr v. Brady, 440 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: In a petition for habeas corpus relief, whether 
“subsection 10G(a) [of the Massachusetts Armed Career Criminal 
Statute] is ‘unduly vague’ because it failed to place [defendant] on fair 
and adequate notice that his prior juvenile adjudications counted as prior 
‘convictions,’ thereby contravening his federal due process rights.” Id. at 
42. 
120 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 3:113 
ANALYSIS: The court adopted the state court’s finding that the 
subsection’s cross-reference to the definition of “violent crime” 
communicated “a legislative intent that an adjudication of a juvenile as a 
youthful offender, a form of aggravated juvenile delinquency, be taken as 
a ‘conviction’ for purposes of [§] 10G.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of 
the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 35. 
 
Kater v. Maloney, 459 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “in a federal habeas proceeding on de novo 
review of a state court’s judgment, . . . [the federal court] may apply a 
new rule of law, which was not clearly established by existing precedent 
at the time the state conviction became final,” where the state court’s 
judgment was reached by “not adjudicat[ing] the presented constitutional 
issue on the merits.” Id. at 58, 62. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that this issue arose in the aftermath of 
a state court’s judgment under Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 
2001) which held that, “post-AEDPA, preserved federal constitutional 
claims on habeas would be reviewed de novo, when such claims were 
not ‘adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.’” Id. at 62. 
However, it rejected the defendant’s claim that this allowed the court to 
promulgate a new rule to decide those issues. Id. at 62-63. The 1st 
Circuit determined that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) still applied 
and required that the court follow clearly established federal precedent. 
Id. at 63. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “[d]e novo review under Fortini 
does not eliminate the need for a habeas court to engage in the analysis 
mandated by Teague.” Id. 
 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a reasonable jury could find that the 
defendant, a former IRS employee, who at the time of her arrest 
threatened police detectives that she would initiate an audit of their 
incomes, violated 26 U.S.C. § 7214, which imposes criminal liability 
upon “any officer or employee of the United States acting in connection 
with any revenue law . . . who is guilty of willful oppression under color 
of law.” Id. at 137. 
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ANALYSIS: The court began by parsing the phrase “willful 
oppression under color of law,” and, having found that the defendant’s 
behavior was both “willful” and “oppressive,” moved to determine 
whether she acted under “color of law.” Id. The court recalled an earlier 
ruling that “misuse of power, possessed by virtue of [federal] law and 
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority 
of [federal] law, is action taken ‘under color of [federal] law.’” Id. at 
138. The court, while conceding that it is difficult to delineate “actions 
taken under color of law from personal pursuits,” decided that the 
difference hinges on “whether the [action] was ‘made possible only 
because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of [federal] 
law.’” Id. Indeed, the court emphasized, the defendant must have the 
“perceived ability to invoke . . . real or apparent authority.” Id. at 139. 
CONCLUSION: A reasonable jury could find that, although the 
defendant made the threats while under police control, she nonetheless 
acted under color of law. Id. 
 
At Home Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 446 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an insider’s acquisition of stock in the 
issuer by acquisition of a third-party intermediary company gives rise to  
. . . liability [under section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934] for short-swing profits (when matched with a sale of the issuer’s 
stock).” Id. at 408. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “[s]ection 16(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires insiders to disgorge profits 
earned in short-swing trading . . . ‘which may have been obtained . . . by 
reason of [the insider’s] relationship to the issuer . . . from any purchase 
and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such 
issuer.’” Id. at 407. The court found that “[u]se of the singular (‘any 
equity security’ and ‘such issuer’) supports an inference that a 
transaction in the equity securities of one company cannot be matched 
with a transaction in the equity securities of another.” Id. at 409. 
Moreover, the court noted that this reasoning was affirmed by the SEC’s 
observation that “the risks that arise when the issuer’s stock is acquired 
indirectly by merger with another company” make it unlikely that 
companies will use this method as a vehicle for circumventing § 16(b). 
Id. The court found that such a method “would be like speculating in 
tractors by buying a farm.” Id.    
CONCLUSION: “[S]ection 16(b) generally does not take account of 
transactions in which an insider’s acquisition of an enterprise holding the 
issuer’s stock entails appreciable risks and opportunities independent of 
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the risks and opportunities that inhere in the stock of the issuer.” Id. at 
410. 
 
S.N. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., 448 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a parent representing his child in an IDEA 
case can obtain attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 603. 
ANALYSIS: At the outset, the court noted that the 3rd and 4th 
Circuits have answered this question in the negative, relying on a 
Supreme Court decision concerning the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Award Act. Id. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the primary 
purpose of a provision authorizing the court to award “a reasonable 
attorney’s fee” was to “enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the assistance 
of competent counsel in vindicating their rights.” Id. As such, the 
Supreme Court argued, the “statutory policy of furthering the successful 
prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates 
an incentive to retain counsel in every such case,” and thus courts should 
not award attorneys’ fees to pro se litigants. Id. Applying this reasoning 
to the present case, the court found that awarding attorneys’ fees to 
parents representing their children in IDEA cases would create a similar 
disincentive for parents to obtain counsel, and thus would jeopardize the 
child’s opportunity for effective representation. Id. at 603. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “[i]n order to best promote the 
effective litigation of a child’s meritorious claims under the IDEA, we 
hold that attorney-parents are not entitled to attorneys’ fees.” Id. at 604. 
 
City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to the U.N., 446 F.3d 
365 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, pursuant to the ‘immovable property’ 
exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act’s (“FSIA”) general 
rule that a foreign country is immune from suit in our courts, a federal 
court has jurisdiction to settle [a] dispute” concerning an “attempt[] to 
collect property taxes from certain foreign missions to the United 
Nations.” Id. at 366. 
ANALYSIS: The court focused its analysis on the “immovable 
property” exception to the FSIA, “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction 
over a foreign state in federal court, . . . which provides that a foreign 
state shall not be immune from jurisdiction in any case in which ‘rights 
in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue.’” Id. at 
369. The court recognized that the dispute between the parties concerned 
solely the meaning of “rights in” as used in that phrase, such as whether 
a dispute concerning taxation constitutes a dispute of “rights in” 
property. Id. The court found that the text of the FSIA was not 
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sufficiently clear in order to render a decision, and turned to the 
legislative history for clarification. Id. at 369-70. The legislative history, 
the court found, demonstrated that “Congress’s intent in enacting the 
FSIA was to largely codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
set forth in the Tate Letter.” Id. at 370. The Court further found that “the 
general principle that animates the Tate Letter” is that “immunity is 
available only where a state is acting in a sovereign capacity, and not 
with respect to a state’s ‘private acts’” and that “ownership of real 
estate in a foreign country must be considered the latter.” Id. The court 
then scoured contemporaneous legal documents and enactments, both in 
domestic and foreign jurisdictions, and determined that the “immovable 
property” exception “is most naturally read to cover not only the foreign 
state’s rights in the property but also its obligations, i.e., rights retained 
in the property by the local state or another party.” Id. at 372. 
CONCLUSION: “[T]he ‘immovable property’ exception to foreign 
sovereign immunity should be construed to include any case where what 
is at issue is: (1) the foreign country’s rights to or interest in immovable 
property situated in the United States; (2) the foreign country’s use or 
possession of such immovable property; or (3) the foreign country’s 
obligations arising directly out of such rights to or use of the property.” 
Id. at 374. 
 
Saloum v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 238 (2d 
Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether this Court has jurisdiction to review an 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a decision 
of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying a petitioner’s request for a waiver 
of inadmissibility under INA section 212(d)(11) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11).” Id. at 239. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit noted that the plain language of the 
statute barred judicial review of an immigration judge’s decision. Id. at 
242. The court explained that the statute specifies that the Attorney 
General, and not the courts, may, in his discretion, waive the 
inadmissibility bar “under certain enumerated circumstances.” Id. The 
2nd Circuit noted that there was an exception to this rule established by 
Congress for “constitutional claims or questions of law” under § 106 of 
the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); however, the 2nd Circuit 
dismissed the petition for review because the defendant was unable to 
“raise any colorable ‘constitutional claims or questions of law.’” Id. at 
242-43. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that courts “lack jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to review the IJ’s discretionary denial of 
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petitioner’s request for a waiver of inadmissibility,” unless defendants 
are able to raise any “colorable ‘constitutional claims or questions” under 
§ 106 of the REAL ID Act. Id. at 244. 
 
Beechwood Restorative Care Ctr. v. Leeds, 436 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether, under New York law, notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing [were] necessary” for due process after the 
“‘annulling’ by [the New York State Department of Health] of [a nursing 
home’s] establishment approval.” Id. at 156. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit explained that “where a due process 
violation results from a ‘random unauthorized act’ by state officials—as 
opposed to an ‘established state procedure’—the availability of a 
‘meaningful postdeprivation remedy’ defeats the claim.” Id.  The court 
held that “[a]n Article 78 proceeding . . . afforded a meaningful post-
deprivation remedy for Appellants’ claimed violation.” Id. at 157. The 
2nd Circuit found that it “need not decide the issue because, even 
assuming that [the nursing home] was entitled under State law to notice 
and a hearing, there was no due process violation.” Id. at 156. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a meaningful postdeprivation 
remedy such as an Article 78 proceeding was sufficient to defeat the 
nursing home’s claim of a due process violation. Id. 156-57. 
 
Gibbs v. Cigna Corp., 440 F.3d 571 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court, “when reviewing the 
administrator’s denial of benefits under an ERISA-governed long-term 
disability plan,” should refer to the version of the summary plan 
description (“SPD”) “in effect at the time the claim is denied or the one 
in effect when the beneficiary became disabled.” Id. at 572. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “absent explicit language to 
the contrary, a plan document providing for disability benefits promises 
that these benefits vest with respect to an employee no later than the time 
that the employee becomes disabled.” Id. at 576. The court noted that the 
defendant’s summary plan description stated that the beneficiary’s “right 
to benefits vested when he became disabled,” and thus “CIGNA’s 
attempt to alter the terms of the SPD was ineffective with respect to 
Gibbs’s benefits.” Id. at 577. 
CONCLUSION: “[W]here an ERISA plan beneficiary’s benefits 
have vested, the summary plan description in effect at the time the 
benefits vest governs for purposes of determining the standard of 
review.” Id. at 572. 
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McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the return of a “No True Bill” by the first 
grand jury negates any presumption of probable cause arising from a 
second grand jury indictment. Id. at 146-47. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that newly-discovered evidence could 
form a basis for resubmission to a new grand jury after a “No True Bill” 
determination, and disagreed with defendant’s characterization that new 
evidence in his case was “inconsequential.” Id. at 147. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “resubmission was properly 
authorized and the consequent grand jury indictment was valid to 
establish probable cause for prosecution.” Id. 
 
United States v. Parker, 439 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court’s determination of financial 
eligibility for mid-case appointment of counsel was proper under § 
3006A(c) of the Criminal Justice Act. Id. at 92. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit conducted a two-fold review of the 
district court’s determination, by first checking if it made an “appropriate 
inquiry” into the defendant’s financial eligibility, then evaluated the 
lower court’s determination of financial eligibility to gauge whether it 
appropriately weighed the “interests of justice.” Id. at 92-93. The court 
adopted the approach of the Supreme Court and other circuits by 
examining many factors rather than limiting itself to one particular 
method of assessing financial eligibility. Id. at 94. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the district court conducted an 
appropriate inquiry and was “not clearly erroneous in concluding that 
defendant was financially ineligible for mid-case appointment” under the 
statute. Id. at 109. 
 
Ming Shi Xue v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 439 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: Whether an immigration judge “may properly base an 
adverse credibility finding on perceived inconsistencies without first 
bringing them to the applicant’s attention when the supposed 
discrepancies or contradictions . . . are premised on ‘dramatically 
different’ accounts of the alleged persecution.” Id. at 121. 
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit noted that immigration judges must 
give an asylum seeker a chance to submit evidence before denying 
asylum, and indicated that allowing a petitioner to address 
inconsistencies in his testimony would limit the risk of immigration 
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judges rejecting applicants they disfavored on a mere basis of a “list of 
[perceived inconsistencies that] can be expanded indefinitely.” Id. at 123. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that “where the perceived 
incongruities in an asylum applicant’s testimony are not plainly obvious, 
an immigration judge cannot rely on them to support an adverse 
credibility ruling without first identifying the alleged inconsistencies for 
the applicant and giving the applicant an opportunity to address them.” 
Id. at 121. Consequently, the court granted the immigrant’s petition for 
review, vacated the decision below, and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. Id. at 128. 
 
Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether [the court has] jurisdiction to review the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision not to exercise its ‘sua 
sponte authority’ to reopen removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.2(a).” Id. at 516. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to statutory language, which 
provides that “the BIA ‘may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own 
motion any case in which it has rendered a decision . . . [and] [t]he 
decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the 
discretion of the Board, subject to restrictions of [§ 1003.2].” Id. at 518. 
Continuing, the court noted that “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a 
motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie 
case for relief.” Id. The court noted that “[s]everal other circuits have 
concluded that the BIA’s failure to reopen removal proceedings sua 
sponte is a discretionary decision that cannot be reviewed by the Courts 
of Appeals.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit “join[ed] its sister circuits in 
holding that a decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte 
under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond 
[the court’s] review.” Id. 
 
Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of Am. v. Union Pac. R.R., 456 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Carmack Amendment applies to the 
domestic rail portion of a single, continuous shipment of goods 
originating in a foreign country.” Id. at 67. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[b]ecause the scope of the 
[Interstate Commerce Commission] jurisdiction provision is co-extensive 
with the scope of Carmack’s applicability and because the Woodbury 
Court interpreted the ‘from . . . to’ language as applying to goods 
traveling in foreign commerce regardless of direction,” “from . . . to” 
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should be interpreted to apply to “goods in foreign commerce regardless 
of the direction of travel.”  Id. at 68-69. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that the Carmack Amendment 
“applies to the domestic inland portion of a foreign shipment regardless 
of the shipment’s point of origin.” Id. at 68. 
 
United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2425 applies to intrastate 
telephone calls and exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause in the United States Constitution. Id. at 38. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that Congress passed § 2425 based “on 
the second type of Commerce Clause power categorized in Lopez, that is, 
the power to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce ‘even though the threat may only come from intrastate 
activities.’” Id. at 41. The court commented that well-established law 
allows Congress to regulate “even purely intrastate use of those 
instrumentalities” under the Commerce Clause. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit denied the defendant’s 
constitutional challenge to the statute. Id. at 41-42. 
 
Sista v. CDC IXIS N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether an employee has a cause of action under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) for involuntary leave imposed 
by an employer. Id. at 174-75. 
ANALYSIS: The FMLA established certain rights for employees to 
take a leave of absence, to be restored to the same position upon return, 
and the right to maintain a civil action.  Id. at 175.  The Act does not 
address the employer’s ability to impose such leave involuntarily upon 
the employee, and such a “forced leave, by itself, does not violate any 
right provided by the FMLA. . . . [T]he FMLA does not create a right to 
be free from suspension with or without pay, nor does the FMLA create a 
right against infliction of emotional distress.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The FMLA does not therefore provide a cause of 
action against an employer when the employee is subjected to 
involuntary leave. Id. 
 
Goldman v. Cohen, 445 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a consumer debt collector’s initiation of a 
lawsuit in state court seeking recovery of unpaid rent is an ‘initial 
communication’ within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act [(“FDCPA”)], 15 U.S.C. § 1692, thereby requiring a debt collector to 
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provide ‘validation notices’ in accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).” 
Id. at 153. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the FDCPA’s validation notice 
requirement applies to attorneys engaged in debt collection, even when 
that activity includes litigation. Id. The court relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), wherein the 
Court held “that the term ‘debt collector,’ as defined in the FDCPA, 15 
U.S.C. § 1692a(6), encompasses ‘lawyer[s] who regularly tr[y] to obtain 
payment of consumer debts through legal proceedings.’” Id. at 155. 
Additionally, the court found that the drafters of the legislation intended 
“initial communication” to include legal pleadings because they 
expressly excluded legal pleadings from another section of the Act. Id. at 
156. 
CONCLUSION: Therefore, “in those portions of the statute that 
mention ‘communication’ without expressly excluding legal pleadings – 
such as § 1692g(a) – legal pleadings are included.” Id. 
 
United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: The court evaluated “[t]he scope of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 
393 (2003) (“Scheidler II”)” which defines the elements of extortion 
under the Hobbs Act.  Id. at 300.  
ANALYSIS: The court determined that Scheidler II held that an 
extortion of intangible property rights could be supported by the Hobbs 
Act and “simply clarified that for Hobbs Act liability to attach, there 
must be a showing that the defendant did not merely seek to deprive the 
victim of the property right in question, but also sought to obtain that 
right for himself.” Id. The court determined that “[t]hat standard can be 
satisfied regardless of whether the property right at issue is tangible or 
intangible.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court “considered all of the defendants-
appellants’ contentions on these appeals and have not found any basis for 
reversing their convictions.” Id. at 350. 
 
Jun Min Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the BIA’s determination that the petitioner 
did not establish extreme hardship was discretionary.” Id. at 175. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it lacked jurisdiction to review any 
judgment granting relief and that judgments that grant relief are 
discretionary. Id. The court determined that “[be]cause these hardship 
determinations are made in the same manner under practically identical 
standards and because De La Vega holds that the cancellation-of-removal 
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hardship determination is discretionary, we join the Fourth Circuit in 
holding that the § 1182(i)(1) hardship determination is discretionary as 
well.” Id. 
 CONCLUSION: “For the foregoing reasons, we lack jurisdiction 
to entertain this petition for review.” Id. at 176. 
 
In re Med Diversified Inc., 461 F.3d 251 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the scope of 11 U.S.C. §501(b) can extend 
beyond its legislative history and purpose. Id. at 255. 
ANALYSIS: The court first determined that the “arising from” 
language of the statute was ambiguous.  Id.  Therefore, it looked outside 
the statute to determine its intended meaning. Id.  From the legislative 
history, the court determined that §501(b) was “a Congressional 
judgment that, as between shareholders and general unsecured creditors, 
it is shareholders who should bear the risk of illegality in the issuance of 
stock in the event the issuer enters bankruptcy.” Id. at 256. The court 
explained that it did not “require the subordination of a claim simply 
because the identity of the claimant happens to be a shareholder [], where 
the claim lacks any causal relationship to the purchase or sale of stock 
and when subordinating the claim[] would not further the policies 
underlying §510(b).” Id. at 259. 
CONCLUSION: The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
finding “that section 510’s mandatory subordination of claims ‘arising 
from the purchase or sale of [a security of the debtor]’ requires 
subordination of Rombro’s claim.” Id. 
 
In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether a court may employ Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to 
certify a class as to a specific issue where the entire claim does not 
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement . . . .” Id. at 226. 
ANALYSIS: The court agreed with the 9th Circuit’s view that the 
plain language of Rule 23 allows a court to certify the class action under 
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) even if it does not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). Id. The court 
noted “[a]s the rule’s plain language and structure establish, a court must 
first identify the issues potentially appropriate for certification ‘and . . . 
then’ apply the other provisions of the rule, i.e., subsection (b)(3) and its 
predominance analysis.” Id. The court also looked to Advisory 
Committee Notes which confirmed its understanding of the rule. Id. 
Finally, the court noted that commentators agree that courts may use 
subsection (c)(4) to certify a single issue of a case.  Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The court remanded the case back to the district 
court with instructions to certify the class action as to liability and also to 
“consider certifying a class for damages.”  Id. at 231. 
 
Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int’l Group, 460 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006). 
QUESTION: Whether “Congress has . . . extended the coverage of 
[42 U.S.C. § 1981] beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States.” Id. at 298. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 “unambiguously 
requires that a person be ‘within the jurisdiction of the United States,’ 42 
U.S.C. § 1981(a), in order to assert rights under the statute.” Id. at 303-
04. The court did not find anything “in the statutory language indicating 
Congress’s intent to allow those outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States to raise Section 1981 claims” where “the relevant 
employment contract was initially formed in the United States or . . . the 
relevant discrimination was directed by persons who were themselves in 
the United States.” Id. at 304. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “absent a ‘clear statement,’ of 
congressional intent to extend coverage ‘beyond places over which the 
United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative 
control,’ the statute[] . . . only protects persons within the United States’ 
territorial jurisdiction.” Id. at 304. 
 
Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a high school student’s T-shirt depicting 
images of drugs and alcohol in connection with a political statement is 
“plainly offensive” within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Bethel School District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), to allow a 
school to abridge a student’s First Amendment free speech rights.  Id. at 
327. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[w]e doubt the Fraser Court’s 
use of the term [‘plainly offensive’] sweeps as broadly as [its] dictionary 
definition, and nothing in Fraser suggests that it does.” Id. at 328. The 
court reasoned that in light of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which protects a student’s right 
to express his political views so long as the speech is not potentially 
substantially disruptive, a broad reading of “plainly offensive” would 
render “the rule of Tinker [to] have no real effect because it could have 
been said that the school administrators in Tinker found wearing anti-war 
armbands offensive and repugnant to their sense of patriotism and 
decency.” Id. The court concluded that the term “plainly offensive” 
relates only to lewd, vulgar or indecent speech which “normally 
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connote[s] sexual innuendo or profanity.” Id. at 327. The court also noted 
that speech that is “offensive as profanity used to make a political point” 
could be prohibited as “plainly offensive” in a school environment 
because a school has an interest in protecting its students from exposure 
to offensive forms of speech but not from the content of speech. Id. at 
329. The court found that pictures of cocaine and alcohol were not an 
offensive form of speech in itself “especially when considering that they 
[were] part of an anti-drug political message.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the images on plaintiff’s T-shirt 
are [not] plainly offensive, especially when considering that they are part 
of an anti-drug political message.” Id. at 329. 
 
THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether an offense must be an aggravated felony as 
defined in the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), in order to be eligible for 
classification as a “particularly serious crime.” Id. at 91. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit applied “fundamental principle[s] of 
statutory construction . . . that words in a statue must be given their 
ordinary meaning whenever possible.” Id. at 104. The court stated that 
“the text and structure of the statute suggest that an offense must be an 
aggravated felony to be ‘particularly serious.’” Id. The court quoted the 
relevant section and reasoned that “[t]he second sentence, authorizing the 
Attorney General to determine when a conviction is ‘particularly 
serious,’ is clearly tied to the first; it explicitly refers back to the 
‘previous sentence,’ and accordingly implies that it is limited to 
aggravated felonies.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “an offense must be an 
aggravated felony in order to be classified as a ‘particularly serious 
crime.’” Id. at 105. 
 
Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int’l Co., Ltd., 436 F.3d 349 
(3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether courts must decide jurisdictional issues, 
here personal jurisdiction, before ruling on forum non conveniens.” Id. at 
358. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by asking whether a dismissal for 
forum non conveniens was a determination on the merits and held it to be 
“[n]either a constitutional Article III jurisdictional issue nor a 
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substantive, merits-related issue . . . [but] a non-jurisdictional, non-merits 
procedural issue.” Id. at 359-61. Next, the 3rd Circuit answered the 
question of whether courts must decide “whether jurisdiction existed 
before dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds” in the affirmative 
for two reasons. Id. at 361. “First, the very nature and definition of forum 
non conveniens presumes that the court deciding this issue has valid 
jurisdiction (both subject matter and personal jurisdiction) and venue.” 
Id. “Second, at least two other circuit courts, and the Supreme Court 
(inferentially), have determined that forum non conveniens dismissals are 
invalid if the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. 
at 362. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit explained that “[d]istrict courts 
either have jurisdiction to decide forum non conveniens motions or they 
do not.” Id. at 363. The court held that “[courts] must have jurisdiction 
before they can rule on which forum, otherwise available, is more 
convenient to decide the merits.” Id. at 363-64. 
 
Ayuk Ako Obale v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the 3rd Circuit had jurisdiction to stay the 
voluntary departure period granted to an alien by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. at 155-56. 
ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit stated that in the review of agency 
decisions, the courts of appeals are granted statutory jurisdiction “of the 
proceeding.” Id. at 156. The court also noted that Congress has explicitly 
made exceptions to the statutory authority of the courts of appeals when 
it deems appropriate. Id. In fact, the court found that Congress explicitly 
removed jurisdiction from the courts of appeals to hear appeals of grants 
or denials of voluntary departure. Id. The court determined from this that, 
if Congress had intended to remove jurisdiction from the courts of 
appeals to grant stays of voluntary departure, it would have also included 
this caveat in its express limitations stated in the statute. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Since Congress did not explicitly remove 
jurisdiction from the courts of appeals to grant stays of voluntary 
departure, the 3rd Circuit has jurisdiction to hear such a motion. Id. 
 
United States v. Nation, 451 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court had the statutory authority to 
issue a criminal forfeiture of mail fraud proceeds where the fraud was not 
perpetrated against a financial institution, and whether the district court 
could direct a forfeiture order for an amount greater than defendant’s 
available assets at the time of sentencing. Id. at 198. 
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ANALYSIS: The 3rd Circuit noted that the government sought 
criminal forfeiture against the defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) 
through the civil forfeiture provision in 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Id. at 
199. Applying the plain language of the statutes, the court determined 
that the statutes act together as a “‘bridge’ or ‘gap-filler’ between civil 
and criminal forfeiture, in that it permits criminal forfeiture when no 
criminal forfeiture provision applies to the crime charged against a 
particular defendant but civil forfeiture for that charged crime is 
nonetheless authorized.” Id. Under this reading of the statutes, the court 
first determined that § 2461(c) permits criminal forfeiture for mail fraud 
because § 981(a)(1)(C) authorizes civil forfeiture for mail fraud and 
second, that no statutory provision expressly provides for criminal 
forfeiture of mail fraud. Id. 
Turning to the second issue, the court found that 21 U.S.C. § 853 
states that “the amount of a criminal forfeiture is directly related to the 
amount of the criminal proceeds.” Id. at 201. Under this statute, the court 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the order could not be for an 
amount in excess of his available funds, stating that to rule otherwise 
would allow defendants to obtain funds unlawfully, spend them, and 
thereby preclude liability. Id. at 202. 
CONCLUSION: The court rejected both of defendant’s arguments, 
upheld his conviction for mail fraud, and affirmed his sentence.  Id. at 
209.  The 3rd Circuit found that the district court had statutory authority 
to issue a criminal forfeiture judgment and that the judgment was proper 
despite the fact that the forfeiture amount exceeded defendant’s available 
assets. Id.  
 
United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether unlawful possession of a pipe bomb, as 
opposed to the use or detonation of a pipe bomb, can qualify as a 
“federal crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A). Id. at 137. 
ANALYSIS: As 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A) does not define “federal 
crime of violence,” the 3rd Circuit adhered to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004), which authorized the 
use of 18 U.S.C. § 16’s definition for the purposes of a section 842(p) 
analysis. Id. at 138. That definition included “any other offense that is a 
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical 
force against the person or property of another may be used in the course 
of committing the offense.” Id. In applying that standard, the court noted 
the importance of the active nature of “used” as opposed to the inactive 
nature of “possession” and found that “[th]ere is no risk that physical 
force might be used against another to commit the offense of possession  
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. . . .” Id. at 139. The court explained that this was despite the fact that 
possession may increase the likelihood of a future crime of violence. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Possession alone does not establish a “federal crime 
of violence” for purposes of either 18 U.S.C. § 842(p), or 18 U.S.C. § 16. 
Id. at 141. 
 
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2006)  
QUESTION: “[W]hether a public employee who was defamed in the 
process of being discharged may state a ‘stigma-plus’ due process claim, 
though he lacked a property interest in continued employment.” Id. at 
244 n.27. 
ANALYSIS: The court explained that in order to state such a claim, 
the claimant would need to show that he had been deprived “of an actual 
constitutional right at all, and if so . . . whether that right was clearly 
established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 244. The court 
found that, while a qualified right may have been violated in this case, 
there was not enough information to determine whether the right in 
question had been clearly established. Id. at 243. 
CONCLUSION: The court declined to rule on the matter until either 
the conclusion of discovery or further evidence was introduced at the 
summary judgment stage. Id. at 244-45. 
 
In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hen a Chapter 11 debtor seeks to terminate 
multiple pension plans simultaneously under [ERISA’s] reorganization 
test, [whether] a court [should] apply the test to each plan independently, 
or to all of the plans in the aggregate.” Id. at 330. 
ANALYSIS: Because the text of ERISA had not addressed this issue, 
the 3rd Circuit looked to the legislative history in order to determine 
congressional intent. Id. at 336. First, the court found that the statutory 
construction offered no guidance to Congress’s intent. Id. at 335. Second, 
the court opined that administering the test plan-by-plan without further 
guidelines would be unworkable. Id. at 337. The court noted that a plan-
by-plan analysis would require the Bankruptcy Court to make unrealistic 
judgment calls, such as the order in which the plans should be judged and 
the ramifications to the others depending on each plan’s new status. Id. at 
337-38. The court found that Congress would not have intended such an 
absurd result and would have delineated further guidelines had that been 
its intent. Id. at 338. Finally, the court held that because bankruptcy 
courts are courts of equity, it would be unfair to force them to choose 
arbitrarily to terminate one plan over another. Id. at 339-41. 
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CONCLUSION: “When an employer in Chapter 11 bankruptcy seeks 
to terminate multiple pension plans voluntarily under the reorganization 
test, Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to apply the test to all of 
the plans in the aggregate.” Id. at 346. 
 
Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars 
jurisdiction [of the 3rd Circuit’s power of review] when there is no 
statute expressly granting discretion to the Attorney General but 
discretionary authority is extant under a federal regulation.” Id. at 231. 
ANALYSIS: The government moved to dismiss Khan’s appeal of a 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals on the basis that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) states “no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . 
any other decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the authority for 
which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the 
Attorney General . . . .” Id. at 230. The court found that the immigration 
judge’s discretion over continuances was not specified under the 
subchapter, although the corresponding federal regulations explicitly 
gave the immigration judge authority to grant continuances. Id. The court 
noted the current disagreement over this issue among the circuits, and 
held that the authority to grant or deny continuance motions was not 
specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a’s broad grant of authority to conduct 
immigration hearings. Id. at 231-33. The court clarified that the specific 
authorization to grant continuances contained in the federal regulations 
could not satisfy the requirement that the specific grant of authority come 
from federal statute. Id. at 233. 
CONCLUSION: “Because the [immigration judge’s] authority to rule 
on a continuance motion is not ‘specified under [8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1378] 
to be in the discretion of the Attorney General,’ we hold that § 
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not deprive this court of jurisdiction.” Id. at 233. 
 
Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “bar[s the court] 
from asserting jurisdiction over visa revocations at the discretion of the 
Attorney General even when the visa holder is already in the United 
States.” Id. at 199. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), 
finding that “Congress has dictated that no court shall have jurisdiction 
to review ‘any . . . decision or action of the Attorney General or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified 
under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.’” Id. The court noted that § 1155 
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specifies authority to be in the discretion of the Attorney General (now 
the Secretary of Homeland Security) to a much greater degree than does 
§ 1153, which the court found subject to review. Id. at 200. The court 
noted a split between the 7th and 9th Circuits on the issue of whether § 
1155 decisions may be reviewed. Id. at 201. The court expressed 
preference for the dissent in the 9th Circuit split-panel opinion stating the 
decisions under § 1155 are unreviewable. Id. at 202. The court reviewed 
its “general standards to determine when a decision is unreviewable 
under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),” noting that it previously held that another 
statute that “explicitly assigns [discretion] to the Attorney General” 
divested the court of jurisdiction. Id. The court found the language in § 
1155, stating that the Attorney General (now Secretary of Homeland 
Security) “may revoke,” “at any time,” and “for what he deems to be 
good and sufficient cause,” explicitly assigned discretion to the Attorney 
General. Id. at 203-04. The court further noted that “the requirement of 
‘for what he deems to be sufficient cause’ . . . is so vague as to be useless 
as a guide to a reviewing court.” Id. at 205. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that “the Attorney General’s 
decision under . . . [section] 1155 to revoke the prior approval of a visa 
petition is an act of administrative discretion that is shielded from court 
review pursuant to . . . [section] 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Id. at 206. 
 
United States v. Stewart, 452 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “a district court’s § 4243(e) order committing 
an individual to the Attorney General’s custody after his acquittal by 
reason of insanity is an appealable final order under § 1291” and, if so, 
what standard of review is appropriate. Id. at 272-73. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that a post judgment order is a final 
decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 if the district court completely disposes 
of the matter. Id. at 272. The 3rd Circuit explained that the underlying 
criminal case was disposed of by acquittal and the post judgment order 
committing the defendant to custody was final, even though it may be 
revisited. Id. at 272-73. As to the standard of review, the court posited 
that analogous situations use a standard of clear error, which allows for a 
proper amount of deference to the trial court. Id. at 273-74. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit joined the 5th, 8th and 11th circuits 
in permitting the appeal of an “order committing an individual to the 
Attorney General’s custody after his acquittal.” Id. at 272. 
 
Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: The court construed the requirements a district court 
must meet when necessarily defining “claims, issues, or defenses 
2006] First Impressions 137 
appropriate for class treatment” under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). Id. at 
184. 
ANALYSIS: The court decided that “the proper substantive inquiry   
. . . is whether the precise parameters defining the class and a complete 
list of the claims, issues, or defenses to be treated on a class basis are 
readily discernible from the text either of the certification order itself or 
of an incorporated memorandum opinion.” Id. at 185. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit established that “the plain text of the 
Subdivision, especially when considered in light of the text and structure 
of parallel provisions in Rule 23, indicate that Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires 
district courts to include in class certification orders a clear and complete 
summary of those claims, issues, or defenses subject to class treatment.” 
Id. at 184. 
 
Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether separation of powers prevents federal courts 
from enjoining “the executive branch from filing an indictment.” Id. at 
178. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by mentioning the Supreme Court’s 
statement that “the executive branch ‘has . . . absolute discretion to 
decide whether to prosecute a case.’” Id. at 183. The court, however, 
noted some exceptions, such as preventing any chilling effect on First 
Amendment rights and a requirement that “the Government must adhere 
strictly to the terms of agreements made with defendants – including 
pleas, cooperation, and immunity agreements – to the extent the 
agreements require defendants to sacrifice constitutional rights.” Id. 
However, because federal courts can hold the government to the terms of 
the agreements it makes with defendants, the court had to address the 
question of whether such enforcement can be in the form of an injunction 
before any indictment can been made. Id. The court examined several 
promises not to charge a defendant in immunity agreements, finding that 
they have often been “construed to protect the defendant against 
conviction rather than indictment and trial.” Id. at 184. 
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit found that the defendants’ claims 
that the agreement provided them immunity from indictment was 
unsupported by precedent and reversed judgment and remanded to the 
district court with instruction to dismiss the complaints with prejudice. 
Id. at 187. 
 
McAllister v. Att’y Gen., 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C) is limited to removal based on enumerated offenses only, 
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or whether other criminal activity not specifically enumerated, such as 
terrorism, triggers the jurisdictional bar. Id. at 182-83. 
ANALYSIS: In an immigration setting, the circuit courts generally 
have jurisdiction to review final removal orders. Id. at 182. However, 
Congress, at times, has expressly denied such jurisdiction to the courts. 
Id. at 183. In 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), Congress provided that “no court 
shall have jurisdiction to review any final orders of removal against an 
alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal 
offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or 
(D).” Id. at 183 n.5. In this case, the 3rd Circuit joined the 1st, 4th and 
7th Circuits in their strict reading of the statutory bar. Id. at 184. 
CONCLUSION: The court “held that for purposes of the 
jurisdictional bar found in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), an alien is not 
‘removable for reason of having committed [an enumerated] criminal 
offense’ unless the final order of removal is grounded, at least in part, on 
one of those enumerated offenses.’” Id. at 184. 
 
Lattera v. Comm’r, 437 F.3d 399 (3rd Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether the sale of a right to lottery payments by a 
lottery winner can be treated as a capital gain under the Internal Revenue 
Code . . . .” Id. at 401. 
ANALYSIS: The court adopted a “family resemblance” test to 
determine whether assets should be classified as a capital gain or as 
ordinary income. Id. at 406. The court explained the “family 
resemblance” test as “[f]irst, we try to determine whether an asset is like 
either the ‘capital asset’ category of assets . . . or like the ‘income items’ 
category . . . . If the asset does not bear a family resemblance to items in 
either of those categories, we move to the following factors.” Id. at 409. 
The court further opined that “[w]e look at the nature of the sale. If 
the sale or assignment constitutes a horizontal carve-out, then ordinary-
income treatment presumably applies. If, on the other hand, it constitutes 
a vertical carve-out, then we look to the character-of-the-asset factor.” Id. 
Continuing, the court explained that “if the sale is a lump-sum payment 
for a future right to earned income, we apply ordinary-income treatment, 
but if it is a lump-sum payment for a future right to earn income, we 
apply capital-gains treatment.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “The lump-sum consideration paid to the [lottery 
winners] in exchange for the right to their future lottery payments is 
ordinary income.” Id. at 410. 
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Sommer v. Vanguard Group, 461 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether Vanguard illegally interfered with 
Sommer’s [Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)] rights when, 
upon his return from approximately eight weeks of short-term disability 
FMLA leave, it did not award him a full annual bonus payment under its 
Partnership Plan, but instead awarded him a payment prorated on the 
basis of the time he was absent.” Id. at 398. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to the controlling language of the 
FMLA as well as Department of Labor regulations and opinion letters, 
and found that if a company bonus program “rewards employee 
production, then proration for FMLA absences is generally allowed; if it 
rewards the absence of an occurrence (like a safety or perfect attendance 
bonus), then proration is not allowed.” Id. The court then examined 
Vanguard’s bonus program and concluded that it was focused on giving 
employees incentives to meet company production goals. Id. at 404-05. 
The court rejected Sommer’s argument that Vanguard violated the 
FMLA by calculating his bonus differently from employees who took 
paid sick leave or vacation leave. Id. The court observed that “as to 
calculating bonus amounts, and specifically proration—§ 825.215(c)(2) 
[the relevant Department of Labor regulation] does not require the equal 
treatment of those who take unpaid forms of FMLA leave and those who 
take paid leave.” Id. at 405. 
CONCLUSION: “Vanguard’s proration of Sommer’s Partnership 
Plan bonus for the time he spent on short-term disability FMLA leave did 
not interfere with his FMLA rights.” Id. at 406. 
 
Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172 (3d Cir.  2006) 
QUESTION: Whether abuse of discretion is the proper standard of 
review for a “district court’s decision to defer to foreign annulment 
proceedings under Article VI of the New York Convention.” Id. at 177. 
ANALYSIS: Article VI of the New York Convention “provides a 
mechanism by which courts asked to enforce an arbitral award can 
adjourn to await the type of proceeding in the situs jurisdiction . . . .” Id. 
at 176. The 3rd Circuit agreed “with the [2nd] Circuit that ‘in light of the 
permissive language of Article VI of the Convention and a district 
court’s general discretion in managing its own caseload and suspense 
docket . . . the proper standard for reviewing a district court’s decision 
whether to adjourn is for abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 177. 
CONCLUSION: The parties agreed to be bound by the New York 
Convention. Id. at 175. Accordingly, the 3rd Circuit held that abuse of 
discretion is the proper standard of review. Id. at 177. 
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Knight v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 F.3d 331 (3d Cir.  2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a [labor] union must permit an individual 
who has been charged with a violation to record his or her disciplinary 
hearing” to satisfy due process as required by the Labor-Managing 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. Id. at 340. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands in 
order to minimize the risk of error.” Id. To resolve this due process 
claim, the court balanced Knight’s “interest in recording against the 
union’s interest in prohibiting recording, and also consider the value of 
recording in safeguarding against error.” Id. Because the union offered 
no “explanation of its interest in prohibiting such a recording” and 
because union disciplinary hearings are more likely to be conducted 
properly if recorded, plaintiff’s interests in recording outweighed those 
against recording. Id. at 341. As a result, the union was required to allow 
plaintiff to record the proceedings. Id. at 343-44. 
CONCLUSION: Based on these particular facts, the 3rd Circuit held 
that denying plaintiff the right to record the disciplinary hearing violated 
plaintiff’s due process rights granted by the Labor-Managing Reporting 
and Disclosure Act of 1959. Id. 
 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., L.L.C., 446 F.3d 541 (4th Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”) provide[s] a covered employee with an absolute right to be 
restored to his previous job after taking approved leave.” Id. at 544. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by pointing out that the FMLA 
provides for “any person who takes FMLA leave [to] be entitled, on 
return from such leave . . . to be restored by the employer to the position 
of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced.” Id. at 
547. The court noted that the FMLA further provided that “nothing in 
this section shall be construed to entitle any restored employee to . . . any 
right, benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or 
position to which the employee would have been entitled had the 
employee not taken the leave.” Id. Recognizing that these provisions 
create a statutory ambiguity, the court turned to pertinent regulation 
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor for resolution of the ambiguity. 
Id. Specifically, the regulation clarified that “an employee has no greater 
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right to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment 
than if the employee had been continuously employed during the FMLA 
leave period.” Id. at 548 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)). Since this 
interpretation resolved the statutory ambiguity, the court joined the 3rd, 
6th, 8th, 10th and 11th Circuits “in concluding that the FMLA does not 
require an employee to be restored to his prior job after FMLA leave if 
he would have been discharged had he not taken leave.” Id. at 547. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the [FMLA] does not create an 
absolute right to restoration to a previous employment position; rather, 
an employer may deny restoration when it can show that it would have 
discharged the employee in any event regardless of the leave.” Id. at 548. 
 
Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a third Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”) action that was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies counts as a strike under the PLRA’s three strikes provision 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), requiring the prisoner to pay all filing 
fees up front, rather than in installments. Id. at 407. 
ANALYSIS: According to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the three-strikes 
provision applies when a prisoner has had a claim dismissed on at least 
three prior occasions “on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .” Id. The 
exhaustion requirement was dealt with separately and distinctly from the 
dismissal provision. Id. at 408. The court expanded its analysis from 
Anderson, where it found that “Congress’s leaving out references to 
exhaustion in some but not all of the subsections of § 1997e must be 
viewed as ‘intentional congressional omission[s],’ such that it would be 
improper to read the PLRA as authorizing sua sponte dismissal of a 
claim on exhaustion grounds.” Id. The court noted that this decision 
applies to “routine” exhaustion dismissals only, and added that other 
situations may arise that would warrant treating a dismissal of an action 
based on the fact that the prisoner did not first exhaust his administrative 
remedies as a strike. Id. at 409. 
CONCLUSION: “Routine dismissals based solely on the fact that 
exhaustion has not occurred . . . do not qualify as strikes under § 
1915(g).” Id. at 410. 
 
Chawla v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 639 (4th 
Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a trust can possess an insurable interest in a 
person’s life. Id. at 648. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that the district court had ruled that 
“the Trust lacked any insurable interest in [a person’s] life.” Id. The court 
recognized that “such a ruling could significantly impact Maryland law 
and how life insurance companies transact business in Maryland.” Id. 
The court stated that “[b]ecause the district court correctly awarded 
summary judgment to Transamerica on the misrepresentation issue, its 
alternative ruling appears to have unnecessarily addressed an important 
and novel question of Maryland law. And, as a general proposition, 
courts should avoid deciding more than is necessary to resolve a specific 
case.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court vacated “as unnecessary the district 
court’s alternative ruling that the Trust lacked any insurable interest in 
Giesinger’s life.” Id. 
 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Williams, 453 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a patient’s receipt of a first, misdiagnosed, 
doctor’s report triggers the three-year statute of limitations for a second 
claim under 20 C.F.R. § 725.308(a). Id. at 616. 
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “nothing bars or should bar 
claimants from filing claims seriatim, and the regulations recognize that 
many will.” Id. The court also pointed to the inherent unfairness in 
running a statute of limitations on a second claim for a doctor’s mistake 
on a first claim. Id. The court further noted “the Act’s remedial nature 
instructs us to interpret its provisions favorably toward miners.” Id. at 
618. 
CONCLUSION: “[A] medical determination later deemed to be a 
misdiagnosis of pneumoconiosis by virtue of a superseding denial of 
benefits cannot trigger the statute of limitation for subsequent claims.” 
Id. 
 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Wise, 447 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether, pursuant to United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 3D1.2, which provides that “counts involving 
substantially the same harm” shall be grouped together, should be 
applied to child pornography charges that involve the same child and 
occur over several days. Id. at 445. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit interpreted U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 as 
consistent with other circuits that had decided similar issues. Id. at 446. It 
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reasoned that the “production [of child pornography] counts occurring on 
different days [were] separate harms.” Id. Thus, counting them as 
separate harms was “consonant with both the plain language of § 3D1.2 
and the examples in the commentary.” Id. The court held that each day a 
sexually explicit video was taken of the same child was a separate harm 
inflicted on the child. Id. 
CONCLUSION: It is consistent with U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2 to refuse to 
“group the production of child pornography counts occurring on different 
days because each time involve[s] a separate harm.” Id. at 447. 
 
In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether a bankruptcy court should consider post-
petition events in deciding whether to dismiss a case for substantial 
abuse under [11 U.S.C.] § 707(b)” when a debtor applies for Chapter 7 
discharge of debts. Id. at 450. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit agreed with other circuits that “a 
debtor’s ability to repay his debts out of future income is a primary factor 
to be considered in determining whether to dismiss for substantial abuse. 
A consideration of the debtor’s future earnings also follows the analysis 
favored by most bankruptcy commentators.” Id. at 455. Furthermore, the 
court stated that an “abuse determination is necessarily forward looking 
because it asks whether creditors would receive more from the debtors’ 
future earnings in a Chapter 13 than they would receive in a Chapter 7.” 
Id. at 456. The court found that § 707(b) requires an analysis of Chapter 
13 in comparison with Chapter 7 relief. Further, it held that “post-
petition improvements in earnings can and should be taken into account 
up until the point at which the discharge is entered.” Id. at 458. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit remanded the case to the bankruptcy 
court because “post-petition events should be considered up until the date 
of discharge [of debts].” Id. at 458-59. 
 
Okafor v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “the signing of the oath form satisfied the 
public ceremony requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)” in order to 
complete the process of obtaining U.S. citizenship. Id. at 533. 
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit followed the 9th and 11th Circuits, 
which found that the clear statutory language of § 1448(a) required 
participation in a public ceremony, not merely a signed oath in front of 
an INS officer. Id. at 534. The court reasoned that a contrary 
interpretation of § 1448(a) “might create unnecessary obstacles to the 
removal of appropriately rejected naturalization applicants.” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit denied petition for review because 
petitioner “failed to show that his signed oath form met the statutory 
requirements of a public oath ceremony, [and] he . . . failed to show that 
he met the requirements for becoming a naturalized citizen of the United 
States. Id. 
 
Bustamante-Barrera v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether under “[8 U.S.C.] § 1432(a)(3)’s ‘legal 
custody’ requirement . . . a child seeking derivative naturalization must 
have been under the sole (as distinguished from joint) legal custody of 
his one naturalized parent.” Id. at 390. 
ANALYSIS: The court reviewed the edition of § 1432(a)(3) 
operative in 1994, which required, among other things, “[t]he 
naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there 
has been a legal separation of the parents.” Id. at 395. The court found 
that, in light of “the text of § 1432(a)(3) and its relation to the overall 
scheme of the INA,” together with the legislative history, § 1432(a)(3) 
did not support derivative naturalization where the child was under joint 
legal custody. Id. at 396. Specifically, the court held that the text stating 
“‘the parent having legal custody’ cannot be parsed to consider, in a 
vacuum, just ‘the parent’ or ‘legal custody.’” Id. Rather, the phrase, 
when taken as a whole, requires that “when only one of two legally 
separated parents is a naturalized U.S. citizen, that parent is the one who 
must have legal custody.” Id.    
CONCLUSION: “[Section] 1432(a)(3)’s requirement that ‘the parent 
having legal custody of the child’ be a naturalized citizen of the United 
States is satisfied only when one of two living and legally separated 
parents is a naturalized U.S. citizen and that parent is vested with the sole 
legal custody of the child.” Id. at 398. 
 
Dale v. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “conduct by an agent acting with apparent 
authority is [sufficient] to trigger the commercial activity exception and 
give a basis for jurisdiction against the state under FSIA [Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act].” Id. at 428. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that in Phaneuf v. Republic of 
Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302 (9th Cir. 1997), the 9th Circuit concluded that 
“[w]hen an agent acts beyond the scope of his authority . . . that agent is 
not doing business which the sovereign has empowered him to do,” and 
therefore “the agent’s unauthorized act cannot be attributed to the foreign 
state; there is no ‘activity of the foreign state.’” Id. 
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CONCLUSION: “[A]n agent’s acts conducted with the apparent 
authority of the state is insufficient to trigger the commercial exception 
to FSIA.” Id. at 429. 
 
Elementis Chromium L.P. v. Coastal States Petroleum Co., 450 F.3d 
607 (5th Cir. 2005) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether liability is joint and several, or several 
only, in [CERCLA] § 113(f) contribution actions.” Id. at 612. 
ANALYSIS: CERCLA provides that all persons found liable under 
its provisions “may seek contribution from any other person who is liable 
or potentially liable under [CERCLA] § 107(a).” Id. The court noted that 
an “overwhelming majority of our sister circuits have concluded that 
liability is merely several under § 113(f).” Id. The court found two 
reasons supporting the imposition of several liability. Id. at 613. First, the 
court found that “under the principle of contribution, a liable party is 
entitled to recover only ‘proportional shares of judgment from other tort-
feasors whose negligence contributed to the injury and who were also 
liable to the plaintiff.’” Id. Second, the court reasoned that “to allow for 
the imposition of joint and several liability in contribution actions under 
CERCLA is to invite ‘inefficiency, potential duplication, and 
prolongation of the litigation process.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The Fifth Circuit held that only several liability is 
appropriate in CERCLA contribution actions. Id. 
 
Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006)  
QUESTION: Whether “an inmate must allege more than a de 
minimis retaliatory act to proceed with a claim for retaliation” under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 684. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[t]o prevail on a claim of 
retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) 
the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her 
exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Id. 
The court noted that “this court has refused to recognize retaliation 
claims based only on allegations of insignificant retaliatory acts.” Id. at 
685. However, “[w]hen confronted with more serious allegations of 
retaliation . . . we have not hesitated to recognize the legitimacy of an 
inmate’s claim.” Id. The court looked to other circuits for an appropriate 
standard, and adopted the D.C. Circuit’s holding that a qualifying alleged 
adverse act is one that “would chill or silence a person of ordinary 
firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Id. at 685-86. The 
court further articulated that “acts, though maybe motivated by 
retaliatory intent, [which] are so de minimis that they would not deter the 
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ordinary person from further exercise of his rights[,] . . . do not rise to the 
level of constitutional violations and cannot form the basis of a § 1983 
claim.” Id. at 686. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit’s de 
minimis standard, holding that “[r]etaliation against a prisoner is 
actionable only if it is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness 
from further exercising his constitutional rights.” Id. 
 
Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the good faith of the plaintiff is, by itself, a 
sufficient reason to defeat the cost-shifting provision in FED. R. CIV. P. 
54(d). Id. at 793. 
ANALYSIS: “Rule 54(d)(1) contains a strong presumption that the 
prevailing party will be awarded costs.” Id. Further, “a court ‘may 
neither deny nor reduce a prevailing party’s request for cost without first 
articulating some good reason for doing so.’” Id. The court noted that 
“every circuit to expressly address the question . . . has ruled that good 
faith, by itself, cannot defeat the operation of Rule 54(d)(1).” Id. at 794. 
Moreover, “[a]ll federal litigants . . . have an obligation to bring suit in 
good faith.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit held that “the losing party’s good 
faith alone is insufficient to justify the denial of costs to the prevailing 
party” and vacated the district court’s ruling on the award of costs. Id. at 
795. 
 
Hudson v. Tex. Racing Comm’n, 455 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Texas absolute insurer rule, 16 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE § 311.104(b), which provides, inter alia, that ‘[a] trainer 
shall ensure that a horse . . . that runs a race while in the care and custody 
of the trainer . . . is free from all prohibited drugs, chemicals, or other 
substance,’ violates the due process clause.” Id. at 598. 
ANALYSIS: The court determined that “[t]o ensure the health of the 
horse, to protect the integrity of the sport, and to protect the betting 
public, the state has a valid objective in seeking to prevent the doping of 
horses.” Id. at 600. The court found that “[t]he absolute insurer rule for 
horse trainers is a reasonable and valid exercise of the state’s police 
power to achieve that objective.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit “agree[d] with the majority of 
jurisdictions that the absolute insurer rule does not violate due process. 
While the absolute insurer rule may be harsh, it is constitutional.” Id. at 
601. 
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Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Navratil, 445 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the failure of a client to elect to appeal an 
adverse judgment prevents the client from pursuing a malpractice suit 
against his attorney. Id. at 404. 
ANALYSIS: Sitting in diversity, the district court determined how 
the question would be answered under Louisiana law, given that there 
were no state statutes or decisions by the Louisiana Supreme Court that 
were on point—an “Erie Guess.” Id. The district court relied on Pieno, a 
state appellate case, which held that clients would be estopped from 
pursuing a malpractice suit in such circumstances. Id. The 5th Circuit felt 
the district court’s reading of Pieno was overly broad and that the 
Louisiana Supreme Court would likely distinguish the present case from 
Pieno and find no such bar existing. Id. The court stated that in Pieno, 
the attorney had not been provided an opportunity to have a hearing on 
the issue of abandonment as his clients made a settlement with the other 
party. Id. at 405. The present case had proceeded through trial to a 
verdict, and thus any negligence on the part of the attorney in executing 
the case would be part of the record and could be determined. Id. 
CONCLUSION: A client’s decision not to pursue an appeal does not 
prevent the client from instigating a malpractice suit against his attorney. 
Id. at 407. 
 
Braud v. Transp. Serv. Co., 445 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether amending a complaint to add a defendant 
‘commences’ a new suit under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(“CAFA”), Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.” Id. at 802. 
ANALYSIS: A suit that was originally filed before the passage of 
CAFA, but was amended to add a defendant to the suit “commence[s] 
the civil action as to the added party,” entitling the defendant to the 
benefits of the CAFA provisions. Id. at 804. The court found that “case 
law holds that generally ‘a party brought into court by an amendment, 
and who has, for the first time, an opportunity to make defense to the 
action, has a right to treat the proceeding, as to him, as commenced by 
the process which brings him to court.’” Id. at 805. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a defendant who was added 
post-CAFA is entitled to its application because the suit commenced 
post-CAFA as to him. Id. 
 
Deaton v. Comm’r, 440 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “a remittance made in conjunction with a 
Form 4868 application for an extension of time to file . . . [should be 
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considered:] (1) a per se rule that all Form 4868 remittances are 
payments . . . [or] (2) a facts-and-circumstances inquiry that would 
require a case-by-case analysis of any Form 4868 remittance made.” Id. 
at 231-32. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that it was “unnecessary to decide 
whether a Form 4868 remittance . . . [was] a payment as a matter of law 
because . . . [it found] that the Deatons’ remittance of $125,000 in 
conjunction with their Form 4868 application for an extension of time to 
file constituted a payment of estimated income tax under § 6513(b)(2).” 
Id. at 232. The court hesitated “to adopt a per se rule in a case in which 
the record clearly indicates that the taxpayers’ remittance was a payment, 
not a deposit . . . .” Id. However, the court noted that “even under the 
facts-and-circumstances approach proposed by the Deatons, their 
$125,000 remittance must be considered a payment of estimated tax.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit left “for another day the question of 
whether all Form 4868 remittances should be treated as payments of 
estimated tax, even though . . . [it] recognize[d] that several of . . . [its] 
sister circuits ha[d] already answered this question in the affirmative.” Id. 
 
Lee v. Cytec Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: In the context of hybrid claims under § 301 of the 
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 185 (“LMRA”), 
whether the six month statute of limitations starts to run “when the 
employees knew or should have known of the union’s breach . . . [or] 
when they knew or should have know that the union would no longer 
process their grievances.” Id. at 676. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that hybrid claims involve two issues: 
the first is an allegation of violation of the LMRA by breaching the 
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 676 n.1. The court explained the 
second as an allegation “that the union acted in such a discriminatory, 
dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as to breach its duty of fair 
representation.” Id. The court explained that “[t]he rationale for 
[equitable tolling] is that because some plaintiffs must exhaust internal 
contractual remedies (e.g. the grievance process) before suing, it would 
be unfair to say that the plaintiffs’ claim is barred by limitations if, while 
the grievance is pending, the six-month federal statute of limitations 
expires.” Id. at 676.  Further, the court concluded that “this exception to 
the general accrual rule could not confer more rights than those that 
plaintiffs would have if they were not entitled to this exception, that is if 
plaintiffs did not have to exhaust internal remedies.” Id. The court noted 
that “[e]quitable tolling is an exception to the general rule that an 
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employee has six months to sue from the discovery of the breach of the 
duty of fair representation.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court “held that to invoke equitable tolling, an 
employee must file a grievance with the union within six months of the 
adoption of a new seniority system.” Id. 
 
Scarborough v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 461 F.3d 406 (5th 
Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a [Chapter 11 Bankruptcy] claim secured 
by an interest in real property that includes the debtor’s principal 
residence as well as other income-producing rental property is ‘a claim 
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s 
principal residence.’” Id. at 410-11. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined § 1332(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 
and found that “in the phrase ‘real property that is the debtor’s principal 
residence,’ Congress equated the terms ‘real property’ and ‘principal 
residence.’” Id. at 410. Therefore, the court reasoned, “the real property 
that secures the mortgage must be only the debtor’s principal residence 
in order for the anti-modification provision to apply.” Id. The court 
further clarified that “[a] claim secured by real property that is, even in 
part, not the debtor’s principal residence does not fall under the terms of 
§ 1322(b)(2).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “[b]ased on the plain 
language of § 1322(b)(2), we conclude that a creditor does not receive 
anti-modification protection for a claim secured by real property that 
includes both the debtor’s principal residence and other rental property 
that is not the debtor’s principal residence.” Id. 
 
United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: The court looked at the “requirements [that] must be 
satisfied for a person on supervised release to waive his right to counsel 
in a revocation proceeding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
32.1(b)(2).” Id. at 648. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that although “the standard for 
waiver of a right to counsel in criminal prosecutions” is well settled, and 
requires the defendant to be apprised of “the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation,” the 5th Circuit has “not addressed the issue in the 
context of a revocation proceeding.” Id. at 649-50. The court stated that 
the right to waive counsel in revocation proceedings does not invoke 
constitutional guarantees under the Sixth Amendment, but heeded the 
Supreme Court’s warning that “‘the loss of liberty’ involved in 
revocation hearings ‘is a serious deprivation,’ even though such 
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proceedings are not a part of the criminal prosecution itself.” Id. at 651. 
The court then recognized that “waivers of the rights protected by Rule 
32.1 must be knowing and voluntary,” and adopted the test of the 1st and 
7th Circuits, which “have declined to require rigid or specific colloquies 
with the district court [to demonstrate whether the waiver was ‘knowing 
and voluntary’], adopting instead a ‘totality of the circumstances’ 
standard.” Id. at 651. 
CONCLUSION: “[A] waiver [of right to counsel in a revocation 
proceeding under FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)] need not meet the formal 
requirements required by the Sixth Amendment, [but] must be knowing 
and voluntary as demonstrated either through a colloquy with the district 
court, or by the totality of the circumstances, or both.” Id. at 648. 
 
United States v. Jensen, 462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether taking an unusual amount of time to pull 
over, coupled with nervous behavior by the driver, amounts to reasonable 
suspicion to justify prolonged detention.” Id. at 404. 
ANALYSIS: The court began by stating that “limited searches and 
seizures are not unreasonable when there is a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that a person has committed a crime.” Id. at 403. The court 
recognized that “detentions [have previously been found to be] 
unreasonable, based on the totality of the circumstances, where the driver 
exhibited signs of nervousness,” but nervousness may be “more 
probative when coupled with [a] delay in pulling over.” Id. at 404-05. 
While purportedly considering the aggregate impact of the delay and the 
nervousness, the court first held that the delay in itself was insufficient to 
create a reasonable suspicion, and then proceeded to hold separately the 
same for nervousness because “the government [did] not present 
adequate evidence of a nexus between [the] allegedly suspicious 
behavior and any specific criminal activity.” Id. at 405. 
CONCLUSION: While, in some cases, “an excessive delay in 
stopping may . . . give rise to reasonable suspicion [to justify prolonged 
detention],” a thirty to sixty second delay in stopping accompanied by 
suspicious behavior unrelated to any specific criminal activity does not 
give rise to such suspicion. Id. 
 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Warrantech Corp., 461 F.3d 568 
(5th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: What is the methodology for reviewing remand orders? 
Id. at 573. 
ANALYSIS: The court applied a clear-statement requirement for 
review of remand orders, while recognizing that other circuits “analyze a 
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remand order for what the district court did rather than what the district 
court said it did.” Id. The court noted that this question had been 
evaluated by the Supreme Court in Kircher, but was not decided upon a 
finding that “the result was the same under either approach.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court retained its clear-statement requirement 
methodology and did not address the issue further because the validity of 
the use of this methodology was not before the court. Id. 
 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
Appoloni v. United States, 450 F.3d 185 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “payments made by school districts to public 
school teachers in exchange for the relinquishment of those teachers’ 
statutorily granted tenure rights [are] considered ‘wages’ taxable under 
[the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”)].” Id. at 189. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 
3121(a), defining “wages” as “all remuneration for employment, 
including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in 
any medium other than cash.” Id. at 189-90. The court noted that in order 
to be eligible to qualify for a payment, a teacher needed to possess tenure 
rights which where gained as a result of working a minimum number of 
years. Id. at 191. The court observed that the payments were in exchange 
for “services performed, rather than for the relinquishment of tenure 
rights.” Id. The court explained that “just because a teacher relinquishes 
a right when accepting early retirement does not convert what would be 
FICA wages into something else.” Id. at 192. The court stated that the 
determinative factor is “how the right relinquished was earned” and 
determined that “the tenure rights at issue were earned through service to 
the employer.” Id. at 192, 195. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that the “relinquishment of the 
tenure rights was incidental to the acceptance of the severance payment” 
and definitively held that “where a payment arises out of the employment 
relationship, and is conditioned on a minimum number of years of 
service, such a payment constitutes FICA wages.” Id. at 191, 196. 
 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2006) 
 
QUESTION: “Whether Michigan’s State Correctional Facility 
Reimbursement Act (“SCFRA”), in conjunction with other Michigan 
laws and with [State] directives . . . runs afoul of ERISA in cases where 
prisoners refuse to inform their pension plans of a change of address.” Id. 
at 968. 
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ANALYSIS: The court observed that if a prisoner did not voluntarily 
inform his pension plan to send payments to his prison address, SCFRA 
directed the prison warden to do so on his behalf. Id. at 969. When 
payment was sent to the prison, it was deposited in an account assigned 
to the prisoner, and up to 90% of the amount was garnished to pay for the 
cost of keeping the prisoner. Id. The court found this practice to 
constitute alienation, since the payment went directly from the pension 
fund to the prison, without an opportunity for the prisoner to exercise 
control over the money. Id. at 974-76. The court ruled this practice 
violated ERISA, which orders pension plans to “provide that benefits 
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.” Id. at 969. 
Thus, the court held, ERISA preempted SCFRA, and prison wardens 
could not order pension plan money to be sent to the inmate’s prison 
address. Id. at 976. The court noted the state could still encumber the 
funds once the prisoner had received them. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The anti-alienation provisions of ERISA preempt 
the address notification regime in SCFRA, and prison wardens may not 
order pension plans to send payments to an inmate’s prison address. Id. 
 
FDIC v. Dover, 453 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “an immediately payable restitution order 
entered under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(3) expired at the end of the criminal 
defendant’s probation period.” Id. at 713. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit followed most circuits and ruled that 
“[e]nforcement of [a] restitution order is governed not by subsection (f)   
. . . but by subsection (h).” Id. at 716. The court held that “[r]estitution is 
a debt, which may be collected using the means appropriate to other 
debts.” Id. at 717. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit reversed the judgment of the district 
court and held that “[d]efendants should not be able to escape payment of 
restitution permanently simply by avoiding payment for a while.” Id. at 
716.  
 
Cobb v. Contract Transp., Inc., 452 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a merger or transfer of assets is a 
precondition to successor liability under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (“FMLA”).” Id. at 550. 
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit found “persuasive the fact that both the 
FMLA and its implementing regulations evidence a congressional intent 
to adopt the doctrine of successor liability developed in federal labor law 
cases.” Id. at 550-51.  The court concluded that “[i]nasmuch as federal 
labor cases do not require a merger or transfer of assets as a precondition 
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to the imposition of successor liability, we decline to impose such a 
requirement.” Id. at 551. 
CONCLUSION: Contrary to the 11th Circuit’s holding, the 6th 
Circuit ruled in line with federal labor cases, finding that a merger or 
transfer is not a precondition to successor liability. Id. at 550. 
 
United States v. Martin, 438 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the United States Sentencing Commission 
failed to comply with Congress’s directive when it established ratios to 
estimate the amount of methamphetamine that can reasonably be 
manufactured from certain precursor chemicals.” Id. at 624. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the “Commission . . . [must] 
base the conversion ratios on both scientific and law enforcement data     
. . . .” Id. at 632. However, “the presumption of regularity that attaches to 
the acts of government officials require[d] . . . [the court] to resolve in 
favor of the Commission any doubt as to the Commission’s compliance 
with the congressional mandate.” Id. at 634. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit “ultimately conclude[d] that Martin 
ha[d] not met his burden of showing that the Commission actually failed 
to base the conversion ratios on both . . . [scientific and law enforcement 
data] when it relied on a report prepared by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA).” Id. at 624. 
 
Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a state employment action for wrongful 
discharge based on federal public policies invokes federal subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id. at 551. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[a] ‘substantial’ federal question 
involves the interpretation of a federal statute that actually is in dispute in 
the litigation and is so important that it ‘sensibly belongs in federal 
court.’” Id. at 552. The court further noted that the lack of a federal 
remedy for the state-law employment action was “tantamount to a 
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the 
statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently 
‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.” Id. The court noted 
that “[t]he Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Campbell v. 
Aerospace Corp., 123 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1997), when it rejected the 
argument that resort to the Federal False Claims Act as a source of public 
policy justified the exercise of federal jurisdiction over a state wrongful 
termination action.” Id. at 553. The court found that “accepting 
jurisdiction of this state employment action would be disruptive of the 
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sound division of labor between state and federal courts envisioned by 
Congress.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a state-law employment action 
for wrongful termination in violation of federal public policy does not 
present a substantial federal question over which federal courts may 
exercise ‘arising under’ jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” Id. 
 
Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether the REAL ID Act grants the courts of 
appeals jurisdiction to review denials of asylum based on untimeliness 
previously barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3).” Id. at 747. 
ANALYSIS: The court followed the reasoning of the 2nd Circuit in 
determining “[t]he term ‘constitutional claims’ clearly relates to claims 
brought pursuant to provisions of the Constitution of the United States.” 
Id. The court also agreed with the 2nd Circuit that giving “questions of 
law” its broadest meaning would create an overflow of cases not dealing 
with “constitutional claims.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit denied the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction because it did not deal with a “constitutional claim.” Id. 
 
United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a defendant’s waiver of a right to appeal 
certain issues in an agreement with the government precludes, as a matter 
of law, an attack on a sentence because it exceeds the statutory 
maximum. Id. at 471. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that many sister circuits did not allow 
an appellate waiver to bar an appeal on the ground that a sentence 
exceeded the statutory maximum. Id. The court acknowledged that the 
circuits utilized varying justifications to allow such appeals, including 
lack of jurisdiction, due process considerations, and the application of the 
unconscionability principle in contract law. Id. at 471-72. 
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit joined the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 
9th, 10th, and 11th circuits in allowing an appeal on the ground that a 
sentence exceeded its statutory maximum notwithstanding an appellate 
waiver, indicating its adoption of the position was based upon a “general 
soundness of the doctrine.”  Id. at 472. 
 
Reg’l Airport Auth. Of Louisville & Jefferson County v. LFG, L.L.C., 
460 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “where a state agency responsible for 
overseeing remediation of hazardous wastes gives comprehensive input, 
and the private parties involved act pursuant to those instructions, the 
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state participation may fulfill the public participation requirement.” Id. at 
709. 
ANALYSIS: The court first noted that “the State did not give 
‘comprehensive input.’” Id. Next, the court stated that “the Authority 
cannot be said to have acted pursuant to the State’s instructions because 
all work commenced prior to State approval.” Id. Finally, the court noted 
that “the Authority never completed a BRA (baseline risk assessment) as 
the State required for risk-based management remedies.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Because the “State’s participation in this case falls 
well short of the standards for vicarious public comment,” the court 
chose not to “decide whether this approach is sound” because “the 
Authority cannot demonstrate compliance with the public comment 
requirements even under this standard.” Id. 
 
Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676 (6th 
Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the two prongs contained in the test set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), 
namely “(1) whether the constitutional claim pursuant to § 1983 is 
virtually identical to the claim under Title IX, and (2) whether Title IX 
provides a remedy comprehensive enough to be exclusive,” were meant 
to be independently evaluated. Id. at 685. 
ANALYSIS: The dissent argued for the “need to engage in a separate 
analysis as required by the Supreme Court in Smith,” and that the court 
“must address this issue as one of first impression in this circuit.” Id. at 
702. The dissent noted that “once a court determines that the 
constitutional claim pursuant to § 1983 is virtually identical to the 
statutory claim, we have reason to assume that Congress intended to 
preclude use of § 1983 to enforce those claims.” Id. However, the 
majority reasoned that the dissent’s “purported presumption finds no 
support in the caselaw,” and “[n]either the Supreme Court nor any of our 
sister circuits have suggested that the second prong is a more difficult 
obstacle for a plaintiff to overcome once the first prong is satisfied.” Id. 
at 685. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the two prongs set forth in 
Smith are intended to be independently evaluated.” Id. 
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SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether a mail-fraud scheme that was carried out, in 
part, by depriving one person of another’s honest services may be a 
predicate offense for a money-laundering conviction . . . .” Id. at 636. 
ANALYSIS: While the court noted that “only ‘proceeds’ can be 
laundered,” the court found that when an offense creates proceeds, 
“which are laundered to hide detection, it is sensible to treat them the 
same as any other proceeds of mail or wire fraud.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit held that “[t]he scheme to defraud 
itself violates [the mail fraud statute], which is a listed predicate offense 
for the money-laundering statute.” Id. 
 
Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a couple’s children had become habitual 
residents of Germany such that their father’s removing them to the 
United States violated the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction and required their return to Germany. Id. 
at 710. 
ANALYSIS: The 7th Circuit stated that, according to the Hague 
Convention, the removal of a child is wrongful where it violates the laws 
“of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately 
before the removal . . . .” Id. at 712. The court looked at the 9th Circuit’s 
decision in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (2001) in order to determine 
in which country the children had become “habitual residents” prior to 
their removal to the United States. Id. at 712-13. Under Mozes, the court 
must first determine whether the parents shared the intent to abandon the 
former habitual residence, and then whether the children had so 
acclimated to their new residence that they are effectively habitual 
residents. Id. at 714. Applying this standard to the present matter, the 
court determined that despite the parents’ desire to return eventually to 
the United States, they had moved all of their belongings to Germany 
and established a home there, the father had found employment in 
Germany, and the children had attended school in Germany. Id. Further, 
the court found that given the very young ages of the children, the three 
years that they had spent living in Germany had comprised the greater 
portions of their lives, supporting the idea that the children had so 
acclimatized to Germany that they were effectively habitual residents. Id. 
at 717. 
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CONCLUSION: Because the children were “habitual residents” of 
Germany immediately prior to their removal to the United States, the 
laws of Germany applied to this case and the children had to return to 
Germany. Id. at 719. 
 
In re McKinney, 457 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether Section 1233 of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 . . . is applicable to 
bankruptcy proceedings filed before the effective date of the provision, 
which was October 17, 2005.” Id. at 624. 
ANALYSIS: Despite the fact that procedural alterations are normally 
applied retroactively, the court noted that this particular provision 
specifically stated that it is not to be applied to pending cases. Id. The 
circuit offered further evidence of this by stressing that the statute 
expressly stated other exceptions, while omitting the requested 
exception. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Based on the premature nature of the case in relation 
to the effective date of the statute, the court found the appeal to be 
outside of its jurisdiction. Id. 
 
United States v. Bonner, 440 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a court should order a district court judge to 
carry out a limited remand in light of a sentencing judge’s recusal. Id. at 
415. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that it had held in United States v. 
Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005), that a “case should be remanded 
to the sentencing judge, not just any judge who might be available.” Id. 
at 416. However, the court noted that “[v]acating the appellants’ 
sentences and remanding for a new sentencing hearing allows the newly 
assigned judge to proceed with a clean slate.” Id. at 417. 
CONCLUSION: “If the sentencing judge becomes unavailable 
following a limited remand under Paladino . . . this court . . . will then 
vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand for a complete resentencing 
hearing in order to permit the successor judge to sentence the defendant 
in conformity with the mandates of Booker.” Id. 
 
United States v. Grigg, 442 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision in United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), striking down 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), 
also eliminated  § 3553(b)(2). Id. at 564. 
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ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd and 10th Circuits faced the 
question and both ruled “that § 3553(b)(2) possesses the same Sixth 
Amendment defect as does § 3553(b)(1).” Id. The 7th Circuit agreed 
with the previous circuits, finding the language of the two sections 
similar and the problems found in Booker regarding § 3553(b)(1) to exist 
within § 3553(b)(2) as well. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Section 3553(b)(2) violated the Sixth Amendment 
for the same reason § 3553(b)(1) was found unconstitutional in Booker, 
and therefore, “subject to the same remedy that Booker” imposed on       
§ 3553(b)(1), replacing language calling for mandatory sentencing with 
language calling for “advisory” sentencing. Id. 
 
Square D Co. v. Comm’r, 438 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether Treasury Regulation § 1.267(a)-3, which 
“provides for the cash method of accounting when claiming deductions 
for payments to a related foreign person” survives Chevron analysis. Id. 
at 742. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that “the Third Circuit 
specifically dealt with this question in its Tate & Lyle decision, 
eventually concluding that Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3 was valid” Id. at 744. 
“As a general matter, ‘respect for the decisions of other circuits is 
especially important in tax cases because of the importance of 
uniformity, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of another circuit 
should be followed unless it is shown to be incorrect.” Id. 
As to the first step in the Chevron analysis, the court found that the 
plain meaning of the Code neither clearly supported nor opposed the 
regulation. Id. As to the second step, the court noted that “Congress 
considered and sanctioned the use of the cash method as a way to 
implement the matching principle to solve the problem of payments to a 
foreign related party.” Id. at 747.  
CONCLUSION: The 7th Circuit found “the regulation a reasonable 
interpretation of the relevant Code provisions, and thus, defer[red] to it.” 
Id. 
 
United States v. McCaffrey, 437 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether unprosecuted, but uncontroverted, crimes fall 
within the double-counting exception of Application Note 2 [of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.2] . . . .” Id. at 688. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that the defendant’s “explicit on-the-
stand confessions during the sentencing phase, corroborated by extensive 
victim testimony and contemporaneous documentary evidence, 
[demonstrated that] the acts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 
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The court further explained that “[t]his approach is consistent with the 
intention of the Guidelines to enable district judges to give extended 
sentences to those with a long history of abusing children.” Id. The court 
stated that “the Guidelines permit judges to depart upward where the 
defendant’s history of abusive behavior is so extensive or so vicious that 
a five-level pattern enhancement is inadequate.” Id. at 688-89. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “the district court properly 
used the defendant’s admitted, uncontroverted, and corroborated acts of 
abuse to justify two distinct upward departures from the guidelines.” Id. 
at 688. 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
 
United States v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether to relax [FED. R. CIV. P.] 9(b)’s pleading 
requirements for complaints brought under the FCA [False Claims Act] 
and to permit early discovery.” Id. at 559. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that some courts “have recognized in 
theory that the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) may be relaxed in 
an FCA qui tam action where the information relevant to the fraud is 
peculiarly within the perpetrator’s knowledge,” though “few courts have 
actually applied [the] standard.” Id. The court also noted that “neither the 
Federal Rules nor the FCA offer any special leniency under these 
particular circumstances to justify [Dr. Joshi] failing to allege with the 
required specificity the circumstances of the fraudulent conduct he 
asserts in his action.” Id. at 560. 
CONCLUSION: The court refused “to relax Rule 9(b)’s pleading 
requirements and allow discovery.” Id. at 561. 
 
Ace Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 440 F.3d 992 (8th 
Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether dismissal was warranted where “insurers had 
neither exhausted their administrative remedies nor established any 
exception to the exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 994. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that while the language of § 6912(e) of 
the Federal Crop Insurance Reform and Department of Agriculture Act 
of 1994 “requires exhaustion, nothing in the text indicates that 
exhaustion was intended as a jurisdictional bar.” Id. at 998. The court 
referenced the Prison Litigation Reform Act, among other legislation, 
that contained similar language, but “does not contain the sort of 
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‘sweeping and direct’ language necessary to impose a jurisdictional 
requirement, but only governs the timing of the action.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “§ 6912(e) is nothing more 
than a codified requirement of administrative exhaustion and is thus not 
jurisdictional.” Id. at 999. 
 
Geach v. Chertoff, 444 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
an alien’s constitutional challenge regarding a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies, which resulted in the alien’s ineligibility for a 
suspension of deportation. Id. at 945. 
ANALYSIS: The 8th Circuit agreed with other circuits that had 
considered this issue. Id. The court noted that it had subject matter 
jurisdiction over unexhausted constitutional claims by aliens, unless the 
claims concerned procedural errors that could be corrected by an 
administrative tribunal. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Because the defendant’s constitutional claim did not 
concern a procedural error, the court asserted its subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider the case on its merits. Id. at 946. 
 
United States v. Oslund, 453 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “the [Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3663A] authorizes an award of future lost income.” Id. at 1062. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “the statute plainly states that a 
victim can recover income that is lost due to a crime causing bodily 
injury, and if that victim dies, then the estate can recover in the victim’s 
place.” Id. at 1063. Yet, the court further determined, “that does not 
mean that it is always proper for lost future income to be awarded in a 
restitution order.” Id. The 8th Circuit explained that “[i]f the amount of 
future income is contested by a defendant and the district court finds that 
determining the proper amount would be unduly burdensome and time-
consuming, the court has the discretion to decline to award future income 
in the restitution order.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “Because there was not an undue burden cast upon 
the court in this case, it was not improper for lost future income to be 
included in the restitution order.” Id. 
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NINTH CIRCUIT 
 
Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether an immigrant’s acceptance in the Family 
Unity Program (“FUP”) “renders him ‘admitted in any status’ for the 
purposes of cancellation of removal.” Id. at 1009. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “[t]he FUP permits qualified alien 
spouses or unmarried children of legalized aliens, who entered the 
United States before 1988 and have continuously resided in the United 
States . . . , to apply for the benefits of the program, which include 
protection from deportation and authorization to work in the United 
States.” Id. at 1009. The 9th Circuit reasoned that acceptance into the 
FUP qualified as “admission” to the United States because “admission is 
not always limited to inspection and authorization at the point of entry.” 
Id. at 1016. The court also determined that “it is only logical that 
acceptance into the FUP confer[red] some type of immigration status on 
the beneficiaries of the program,” and thus satisfied the meaning of “in 
any status” for the purposes of cancellation of removal. Id. at 1018. 
CONCLUSION: “The plain meaning of ‘admitted in any status,’ the 
legislative history of § 1229b, and the precedential decisions of the BIA 
[Board of Immigration Appeals] and this circuit, lead us to hold that 
acceptance into the Family Unity Program constitutes ‘admitted in any 
status’ for the purposes of cancellation of removal.” Id. at 1018-19. 
 
Chuck v. Hewlett Packard Co., 455 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether ERISA’s statute of limitations may bar a 
claim for benefits notwithstanding a plan’s failure to fulfill its disclosure 
and review obligations under ERISA § 503, 29 U.S.C. § 1133.” Id. at 
1029. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “an ERISA cause of action accrues 
either at the time the benefits are actually denied or when the insured has 
reason to know that the claim has been denied.” Id. at 1031. The court 
found that “a plan’s violation of § 1133 does not always prevent the 
triggering of ERISA’s statutory limitations period.” Id. at 1033. First, 
there are “unusual circumstances” where a claimant may have reason to 
know that they will be denied ERISA benefits. Id. Thus a “claimant with 
actual knowledge of his internal appeal rights under a plan, for example, 
could not contend that a benefits denial was non-final simply because the 
plan did not remind him of those rights.” Id. Second, the court stated an 
interest in a “policy of finality and repose” that would be compromised 
by delay and have “negative effects on the availability of witnesses and 
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evidence.” Id. at 1034. Finally, the court stated that an extended statute 
of limitation would obstruct “claimants’ access to meaningful remedies.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the plan’s violation of its 
notification and review obligations under ERISA is a highly significant 
factor, but not a dispositive one.” Id. at 1031. “An investigation of the 
facts of each case is necessary to determine whether a plan nevertheless 
foreclosed a claimant from any reasonable belief that the plan had not 
finally denied benefits.” Id. at 1036. 
 
Kepilino v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a state law conviction [for prostitution] 
renders an alien inadmissible under federal immigration law.” Id. at 
1059. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that in order “[t]o determine whether a 
specific crime falls within a particular category of inadmissible predicate 
crimes, we apply the categorical approach . . . and focus narrowly on the 
elements of the crime as defined by its statutory language.” Id. at 1060. 
When the federal statute of conviction is “categorically broader than the 
State Department’s definition of the crime, we next employ the modified 
categorical approach, which requires that we ‘look beyond the language 
of the statute to a narrow, specified set of documents that are part of the 
record or conviction . . . .’” Id. at 1062. The court specified that the state 
record of conviction must “demonstrate[] that [the defendant] was 
convicted of the crime” as defined in the federal statute. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The state’s record of conviction does not 
“establish[]that [the defendant’s] conduct falls within the C.F.R.’s 
definition of ‘prostitution.’ Accordingly, we find that [the defendant’s] 
offense was not a crime of prostitution under the modified categorical 
approach.” Id. at 1063. 
 
United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether police may conduct a search based on less 
than probable cause of an individual released while awaiting trial.” Id. at 
864. 
ANALYSIS: The court dictated that when an individual is released 
while awaiting trial, “the Government’s proposed conditions of release    
. . . [must] not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.” Id. at 867. 
The court posited that in “cases where the risk of flight is so slight . . . 
any amount of bail is excessive [and] release on one’s own recognizance 
would then be constitutionally required, which could further limit the 
government’s discretion to fashion conditions of release.” Id. The court 
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explained that while the Government may have the right to keep 
someone in jail, that right does not confer the right to subject a release to 
unconstitutional conditions. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court determined that a release conditioned on 
consent to search based on less than probable cause is excessive. Id. 
 
Moyer v. Alameida, 184 F. App’x 633 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether an ‘administrative fee’ attached to a 
restitution fine is punitive under the Ex Post Facto Clause . . . .” Id. at 
636. 
ANALYSIS: The court examined legislative intent in order to 
determine whether a statutory scheme is civil or punitive. Id. The court 
posited that if the statute is punitive, or if it is civil, but the purpose or 
effect is so punitive “as to negate [the legislature’s] intention to deem it 
civil,” then it is a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. The court 
was unwilling to find non-punitive intent where the legislature’s stated 
purpose contradicted with the legislative history. Id. at 638. The court 
declared that where “evidence of legislative intent . . . is ambiguous, [the 
court] must rely more heavily on an analysis of whether the statute is 
punitive in effect.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that in order to determine punitive 
effect, the seven Kennedy factors should be used as useful guideposts. Id. 
The court noted that these factors are neither dispositive nor exhaustive. 
Id. 
 
Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2006)  
QUESTION: “Whether a habeas petitioner’s inability to obtain 
Spanish-language materials or procure translation assistance can be 
grounds for equitable tolling of the [Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)]’s one-year limitations period.” Id. at 
1069. 
ANALYSIS: The court announced two elements that a litigant who 
cannot communicate in English, seeking equitable tolling of the AEDPA 
limitations period, must establish: “(1) that he has been pursuing his 
rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in 
his way.” Id. at 1068. The court examined a 9th Circuit holding that the 
“unavailability of a copy of the AEDPA . . . could be grounds for 
statutory tolling” and determined that the petitioner’s inability to procure 
Spanish-language legal materials was analogous to a copy not being 
available. Id. at 1069. 
CONCLUSION: The court rejected “a per se rule that a petitioner’s 
language limitations can justify equitable tolling,” but held that where a 
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petitioner lacks English language ability, access to Spanish-language 
materials, or cannot obtain the services of a translator, the petitioner may 
be entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s one-year limitations 
period. Id. at 1069-71. 
 
Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “a [Visa Waiver Program (“VWP”)] entrant 
[who] files an adjustment of status application as an immediate relative   
. . . is no longer subject to the Visa Waiver Program’s no-contest clause,” 
and whether “an alien widow whose citizen spouse filed the necessary 
immediate relative petition form but died within two years of the 
qualifying marriage nonetheless remains a spouse for purposes of 8 
U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).” Id. at 1033-34. 
ANALYSIS: Turning to the first question, the court outlined the 
VWP, which “authorizes the government to waive visa requirements for 
citizens of certain favored countries,” but prohibits persons who enter the 
country under this program from contesting their right to remain in the 
United States. Id. at 1034. Specifically, the court noted, “under the no-
contest clause, [one agrees] to waive any right . . . ‘to contest . . . any 
action for removal.’” Id. The court recognized that aliens who enter the 
country under the VWP may file an application to adjust their status, 
which triggers “certain procedural safeguards.” Id. The court then ruled 
that these procedural protections trumped the no-contest clause, because 
“having granted VWP visitors the right to seek an adjustment of status, it 
makes no sense for Congress to have intended that these preferred 
visitors by definition . . . should have second-class status [to non-favored 
aliens] once they enter into the adjustment of status process.” Id. at 1035. 
Addressing the second question, the court considered the contested 
language of  § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), which states that “[i]n the case of an 
alien who was the spouse of a citizen of the United States for at least 2 
years at the time of the citizen’s death . . . the alien . . . shall be 
considered . . . to remain an immediate relative after the date of the 
citizen’s death.” Id. at 1038. The court interpreted this provision as 
creating a pre-application definition of “immediate relative,” as opposed 
to a post-application requirement that the alien remain married to the 
citizen-spouse for two years. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
determined that the Board of Immigration Appeals’s interpretation to the 
contrary was not entitled to deference under Chevron because “Congress 
clearly intended an alien widow whose citizen spouse has filed the 
necessary forms to be and to remain an immediate relative (spouse) . . . 
even if the citizen spouse dies within two years of the marriage.” Id. at 
1039. 
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CONCLUSION: With respect to the first question, “once a VWP 
entrant files an adjustment of status application as an immediate relative  
. . . the alien is entitled to the procedural guarantees of the adjustment of 
status regime . . . and to that extent is no longer subject to the Visa 
Waiver Program’s no-contest clause.” Id. at 1033-34. In regard to the 
second question, the alien widow “remains a spouse for purposes of 8 
U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and is entitled to be treated as such.” Id. at 
1034. 
 
Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether certain provisions of the Medicaid Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10) and 1396a(a)(17), create individual rights 
enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Id. at 1154. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[a]ccording to [§ 1396a(a)(10)], a 
state plan for medical assistance must provide ‘for making medical 
assistance available, including at least the care and services listed in 
paragraphs (1) through (5) . . . of [§ 1396d(a)] of this title,’ to ‘all 
individuals’ meeting specified financial eligibility standards.” Id. at 
1159. The court utilized the set forth by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. 
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), holding that § 1396a(a)(10) created a 
private right of action because “1) [Congress] intended the statutory 
provision to benefit the plaintiff; 2) [the] asserted right is not so ‘vague 
and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence; 
and 3) that the provision couch the asserted right in mandatory rather 
than precatory terms.” Id. at 1158. However, the court held that § 
1396a(a)(17), which “provides that a state plan for medical assistance 
‘must . . . include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for 
all groups . . . ) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical 
assistance under this plan,” did not create an individual cause of action. 
Id. at 1162. The court held that because the statute mentioned neither 
individuals nor persons and did not “provide meaningful instruction for 
the interpretation of ‘reasonable standards’ in terms of medical need,” § 
1396a(a)(17) failed both the first and second prongs of the Blessing test. 
Id. at 1162-63. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held “that section 1396a(a)(10) 
creates an individual right enforceable under section 1983 . . . [and] that 
section 1396a(a)(17) does not create such an individual right. Id. at 1155. 
 
United States v. Ye, 436 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the court had “jurisdiction to hear the 
government’s interlocutory appeal under [18 U.S.C.] § 1835” when the 
district court’s order “[did] not mandate the disclosure of any trade secret 
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materials that [had] not already been previously disclosed by the 
government.” Id. at 1120. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that by the plain language of the 
statute, “§ 1835 grants interlocutory appellate jurisdiction only when a 
district court’s order authorizes or directs the disclosure of a trade 
secret,” and here “the district court’s order does not direct the disclosure 
of a trade secret.” Id. at 1121. The 9th Circuit held that “[b]ecause the 
purpose of the district court’s order was only to clarify exactly which 
materials the government contends constitute the protected trade secrets, 
and all relevant materials had already been turned over, the district 
court’s order [did] not direct or authorize the ‘disclosure’ of trade secrets 
as required by the plain language of § 1835.” Id. The court also found 
that the legislative history, which emphasized protecting corporations 
involved in litigation from exposing trade secrets to the public, supported 
this interpretation. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “§ 1835 [did] not provide [the 
Court] with jurisdiction over this appeal because the government had 
already disclosed all of the relevant trade secret materials prior to the 
making of the order at issue.” Id. at 1119. 
 
United States v. Blandin, 435 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether an escapee’s subjective intent to return to 
custody could qualify for a downward adjustment under § 2P1.1(b)(2) 
[of the United States Sentencing Guidelines].” Id. at 1194. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the commentary to section 2P1.1 
explains, “‘returned voluntarily’ includes voluntarily returning to the 
institution or turning one’s self in to a law enforcement authority as an 
escapee.” Id. at 1195. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 7th and 8th 
Circuits, which held that choosing to surrender to authorities when faced 
with the prospect of being arrested was not the “willingness to 
cooperate” that § 2P1.1(b)(2) “had in mind.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[R]egardless of whether the [escapee] had formed 
the subjective intent voluntarily to surrender, his return to custody cannot 
be considered voluntary under § 2P1.1(b)(2) because his willingness to 
cooperate arose in connection with his arrest for [another crime].” Id. 
 
Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a plaintiff was so deprived of her protected 
liberty interest in visiting her son that she has a cognizable substantive or 
procedural due process claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 993. 
ANALYSIS: In analyzing the substantive due process argument, the 
9th Circuit followed precedent set by other circuits in cases that are 
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factually similar to the present matter. Id. at 992-93. The court reasoned 
that because the right at issue was only for visitation, not for custody, 
and the visitation period deprived was only a week in duration, plaintiff’s 
claim does not support a substantive due process violation. Id. at 996. 
The court also reasoned that since the police had statutory authority not 
only to remove the child from plaintiff’s custody, but also to arrest 
plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the court visitation order, the police’s 
actions were “objectively reasonable” and plaintiff’s substantive due 
process rights were not violated. Id. at 997. Turning to plaintiff’s 
procedural due process claim, the court restated that plaintiff has a 
protected liberty interest in her right to visitation with her son. Id. at 
1000. The court then applied the balancing test from Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and looked to other circuit precedents for 
guidance. Id. at 1000-02. The court determined that the Mathews 
balancing test, as applied here, favors a finding that plaintiff’s procedural 
due process rights were not violated. Id. Further, the court rejected 
plaintiff’s argument that a pre-deprivation hearing was necessary, finding 
that other circuits have determined that no pre-deprivation hearing is 
required in cases such as this. Id. at 1002. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that the plaintiff unsuccessfully pled 
a violation of both her substantive and procedural due process rights, and 
reversed the decision of the lower court entitling plaintiff to a pre-
deprivation hearing. Id. at 1003. 
 
United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court may impose penile 
plethysmograph testing as a condition for supervised release of convicted 
sex offenders. Id. at 554. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that under the applicable statutes, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3583 and 3553(a), conditions of supervised release are 
permissible only when they are “reasonably related to the goal of 
deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender.” Id. 
at 558. In addition, the condition must not involve a deprivation of 
liberty any greater than is necessary to meet the above-stated goals. Id. In 
analyzing the condition in the present matter under this two-prong 
standard, the court determined that the relative success of the 
plethysmograph testing in treating sex offenders proves that it reasonably 
related to the goals of deterrence, public protection and rehabilitation. Id. 
at 566-67. However, the court also determined that the district court did 
not make the necessary record findings showing that there is no less 
intrusive means available and that the deprivation of defendant’s liberty 
was no greater than necessary. Id. at 570. 
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CONCLUSION: The court vacated the order requiring defendant to 
submit to the plethysmograph test as a condition of his supervised release 
because the district court did not present the necessary record findings to 
show that the condition involved no greater deprivation of liberty than 
was necessary. Id. 
 
Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the nature of the “forum defendant rule 
contained in [28 U.S.C.] § 1441(b)” is procedural or jurisdictional. Id. at 
935. 
ANALYSIS: First, the court dealt with its jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. Id. at 938. The court noted that “this is one of those rare cases in 
which we must decide the merits [of the appeal] to decide [the propriety 
of our] jurisdiction.” Id. at 938. The court then discussed a related case 
involving a local, diverse defendant and his post-removal joinder. Id. at 
936 n.3. The 9th Circuit previously held that joinder did not require 
remand to state court as it is procedural rather than jurisdictional. Id. In 
affirming the Spencer court’s conclusion there, the court in the present 
matter based its decision on “the fact that the local defendant was joined 
after the case had been removed to federal court, and, therefore, the 
defendants did not violate the forum defendant rule at the time of 
removal.” Id. The court further noted that it affirmed without disagreeing 
with the district court’s determination that § 1441(b) was a procedural 
rule. Id. 
CONCLUSION: “We join eight of the nine circuits that have decided 
this issue and hold that the forum defendant rule is procedural, and 
therefore a violation of this rule is a waivable defect in the removal 
process that cannot form the basis for a district court’s sua sponte remand 
order.” Id.  
 
United States v. Casch, 448 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a court’s failure to instruct a jury on venue 
constitutes reversible error. Id. at 1116. 
ANALYSIS: The defendant, Mark Casch, was indicted for crimes 
committed “in the District of Idaho or elsewhere.” Id. The jury 
instructions after trial did not include any instruction on venue. Id. The 
court acknowledged the trial court’s failure to instruct on venue 
constituted error, but held “[t]he error, which deprives the command in 
Article III of effect, is of constitutional magnitude, but it is not 
structural—that is, it does not deprive the trial of fundamental fairness.” 
Id. at 1117. The court applied a harmless error analysis used in similar 
cases in the 4th and 8th Circuits, and found that “[b]ecause the evidence 
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that Casch committed conspiracy in Idaho was ‘substantial’ and 
‘uncontroverted,’ the district court’s error was harmless.” Id. at 1118. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “proof of venue may be so clear 
that failure to instruct on the issue is not reversible error.” Id.  
 
United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: What is the “extent of an unauthorized driver’s 
standing to challenge a rental automobile search.” Id. at 1197. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that a legitimate expectation of privacy 
was necessary to have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a 
search. Id. at 1196. The court noted 9th Circuit precedent which held that 
a person must have “possessory or ownership interest” in an item in 
order to possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The court 
clarified that a “possessory or ownership interest” had a broad definition, 
including common authority and joint control arising from an owner’s 
grant of permission to another to exercise control over the owner’s 
property. Id. at 1197-99. 
CONCLUSION: “An unauthorized driver may have standing to 
challenge a search if he or she has received permission to use the car.” 
Id. at 1199. 
 
Lindsey v. SLT L.A., L.L.C., 447 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: How should the four elements necessary to establish a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination be adapted to suit 
contract discrimination claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 
1145. 
ANALYSIS: The four elements necessary to establish a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination are: “that [the plaintiff] belongs to a 
racial minority; . . . he applied and was qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; . . . despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and . . . after his rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.” Id. at 1144 n.2. The court followed the 6th and 7th 
Circuits in adapting the first three elements as follows: “(1) [plaintiff] is 
a member of a protected class, (2) [plaintiff] attempted to contract for 
certain services, and (3) [plaintiff] was denied the right to contract for 
those services.” Id. at 1145.  
The court noted that the 6th and 7th Circuits are split over the 
proper adaptation of the fourth element, noting that the 7th Circuit 
“requires that such services remained available to similarly-situated 
individuals who were not members of the plaintiff’s protected class. Id. 
However, the court noted the Sixth Circuit concluded “that this flat 
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requirement is too rigorous in the context of the denial of services by a 
commercial establishment, because customers often have no way of 
establishing what treatment was accorded to other customers.” Id. The 
court resolved this difference by stating that the 6th Circuit therefore 
adapted the fourth element “to require: ‘that (a) plaintiff was deprived of 
services while similarly situated persons outside the protected class were 
not and/or (b) plaintiff received services in a markedly hostile manner 
and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively 
discriminatory.’” Id. The court declared the 6th Circuit’s reasoning to be 
more persuasive but found it unnecessary to decide the issue since the 
defendants in the case had clearly met the 7th Circuit’s more demanding 
requirement. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court followed the 6th and 7th Circuit’s joint 
adoption of the first three elements of a prima facie case of contract 
discrimination, and found it unnecessary to choose a side on their split 
regarding the fourth element, because the defendant’s conduct clearly 
met the stricter standard. Id. 
 
Crowley Marine Servs. v. Maritrans Inc., 447 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the district court properly applied “[Rule 2(b)] 
of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, . . . 
[codified by] 33 U.S.C. § 1602, better known by [the] acronym as the 
‘COLREGS.’” Id. at 721. 
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the lower court’s finding that “courts 
have either expanded the scope of Rule 2(b)’s special circumstances 
[exception] or have created a wholly separate category of special 
circumstances involving vessels operating in concert and pursuant to 
agreed maneuvers.” Id. at 725. The court turned to the plain language of 
Rule 2(b), which provides that “in construing and complying with these 
Rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision 
and to any special circumstances, including limitations of the vessels 
involved, which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to 
avoid immediate danger.” Id. The court held that “vessels may justify 
departure from the COLREGS in order to avoid immediate danger, but 
not for more generic special circumstances.” Id. The court noted that 
“[t]his interpretation is echoed in one of the leading admiralty law 
treatises.” Id. The court also noted that the Rules are “strictly and 
literally construed, and compliance is insisted upon.” Id. at 726. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that vessels are not excused 
under Rule 2(b) from adhering to the COLREGS except in situations of 
immediate danger, and the lower court “should consider the pre-arranged 
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escort plan, along with all the other facts, when it apportions fault.” Id. at 
728. 
 
Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether [the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) must 
give] a juvenile whose status is adjudicated under [the Federal Juvenile 
Delinquency Act (“FJDA”)] . . . credit against his or her sentence for 
time spent in pre-sentence custody.” Id. at 1003. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “before 1999 the BOP consistently 
applied [18 U.S.C.] § 3585 [requiring the BOP to give credit for any time 
spent in official detention prior to sentencing] to juveniles when 
calculating their sentences under the FJDA.” Id. at 1002. However, “[t]he 
BOP reversed course in 1999 . . . [and] revised its policy to . . . refuse[] 
to credit juveniles with pre-sentence time served.” Id. After an extended 
review of related statutes, legislative history, and statutory purpose, the 
court recognized that Congress, in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, which included revisions to § 3585 and the FJDA, “intended for 
the BOP to continue to credit juveniles with time spent in pre-sentence 
custody.” Id. at 1010. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons must give “juveniles . . . credit for pre-sentence custody and 
accordingly reverse[d the district court ruling].” Id. at 1002. 
 
United States v. Beng-Salazar, 452 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2006). 
QUESTION: “Whether [the defendant] preserved his challenge to 
the court’s mandatory use of the Sentencing Guidelines,” when he failed, 
prior to his briefing in appellate court, to “explicitly argue that the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional because of their 
mandatory nature, or that mandatory application of the Guidelines to his 
case was error.” Id. at 1093. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that it was “unlikely that any 
defendant would have objected to a judge’s use of mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines, prior to the Supreme Court’s January 2005 decision in 
Booker.” Id. The court also noted that the “First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits each have recognized that 
a defendant’s argument that Apprendi or Blakely undermined the Federal 
Guidelines, or that he was entitled to have a jury determine the 
sentencing factors in his case, preserved his claim of nonconstitutional 
Booker error.” Id. at 1093-94. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that defendant’s “timely Sixth 
Amendment objections, based on Apprendi and Blakely were sufficient 
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to preserve his Booker challenge to the court’s imposition of his sentence 
using the erstwhile mandatory Guidelines.” Id. at 1090. 
 
Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Board [of Immigration Appeals] is bound 
by the scope of [a 9th Circuit] remand” or whether new issues can be 
raised during a remand proceeding. Id. at 1173. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that just as in civil and criminal cases, 
where the circuit court’s remand limits the district court, the Board here 
must consider only specific issues already presented, provided that the 
scope of the remand is clear. Id. The court explained that “[t]he Board, 
like the district court, has no power to expand our remand beyond the 
boundary ordered by the court. This is consistent with orderly 
administration of justice.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the Board was bound by the 
scope of our remand to resolve the only remaining issue . . . [and] the 
proper method [for future plaintiffs] to raise this argument would [be] to 
file a motion to reconsider with the Board.” Id. 
 
Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, L.P., 437 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a limited liability company should be treated 
as a partnership or as a corporation to determine citizenship for purposes 
of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 899. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “LLCs resemble both partnerships 
and corporations. Notwithstanding LLCs’ corporate traits, however, 
every circuit that has addressed the question treats them like partnerships 
for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.” Id. The court noted that “[t]his 
treatment accords with the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to 
extend the corporate citizenship rule to non-corporate entities, including 
those that share some of the characteristics of corporations.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit held that, “like a partnership, an 
LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are 
citizens.” Id. 
 
Aguirre v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “the ‘degree of success’ standard announced 
in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), appl[ies] to attorney’s fees 
awards under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 
20 U.S.C. § 1400.” Id. at 1115. 
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ANALYSIS: The court first considered Supreme Court precedent 
stating that “a partially prevailing plaintiff generally may not recover 
fees for her unsuccessful claims . . . .” Id. at 1118. Next, the court found 
that Congress instituted a fee shifting provision that allowed attorney’s 
fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in the predecessor to the IDEA 
statute. Id. Finally, the court ruled that Congress is assumed to be aware 
of the controlling law, in this case, Hensley’s definition of prevailing 
party in relation to attorney’s fees, when it makes new law as per Strom 
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999). Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit found that the rule for apportioning 
attorney’s fees only to successful claims as stated in Hensley applies to 
claims brought under the IDEA. Id. at 1121. 
  
United States v. Choudhry, 461 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a parking violation is considered an 
administrative civil violation or traffic violation, the latter of which can 
provide reasonable suspicion for a search. Id. at 1101. 
ANALYSIS: The court considered the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, which “stands for the proposition 
that if the officers have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 
occurred, the officers may conduct a traffic stop.” Id. at 1100. While 
California law considers parking violations to be civil violations, the 
court still found that “[t]he structure of the California Vehicle Code, the 
authority of law enforcement officers to enforce the Vehicle Code, and 
the specific authority granted to San Francisco City and County police 
officers to enforce the violation at issue lead us to conclude that Whren 
controls Choudhry’s case.” Id. at 1103. 
CONCLUSION: The court sided with the 5th, 6th and 7th Circuits in 
finding that Whren controlled parking violations, and therefore a parking 
violation can provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Id. 
at 1101. 
 
Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a consumer may waive a “cease-
communication directive” pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). Id. at 1168. 
ANALYSIS: Under § 1692c(c), a debt collector subject to a cease-
communication directive may only contact the debtor: (1) to advise the 
debtor that future collection efforts will be terminated; (2) to notify the 
debtor that the debt collector may invoke special remedies; or (3) to 
notify the debtor that the debt collector intends to invoke a specified 
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remedy. Id. at 1169. The 9th Circuit determined that where, as here, 
Congress has not intended to preclude waiver of the rights contained in a 
federal statute, those rights may be waived by the voluntary agreement of 
the parties. Id. at 1170. The court determined that such waiver may be 
made here under the heightened voluntariness standard of the “least 
sophisticated debtor.” Id. at 1171. In choosing to apply this standard, the 
court explained that the FDCPA is a remedial statute aimed to protect 
debtors from “an industry-wide pattern of and propensity towards 
abusing debtors.” Id. In allowing debtors to waive the remedial rights 
contained in the FDCPA, the court opined that it is necessary to use a 
heightened standard of voluntariness to ensure that the FDCPA protects 
all consumers, including “the gullible, as well as the shrewd . . . the 
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: A debtor may waive a cease-communication 
directive pursuant to the FDCPA if it is proven that the debtor voluntarily 
waived such rights under the heightened voluntariness standard of the 
“least sophisticated debtor.” Id. at 1171-72. 
 
Ford v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “a parent performing legal services for her 
own child [is] entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to the IDEA.” Id. at 
1088. 
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit looked to Kay v. Ehler, 499 U.S. 432 
(1991), where the Supreme Court denied attorneys’ fees to a pro se 
litigant under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which contains a fee-shifting provision 
“virtually identical” to the one at issue in this case. Id. at 1090. In Kay, 
the Supreme Court determined that the intent behind § 1988 was to 
“ensure that victims of civil rights violations benefit from ‘the judgment 
of an independent third party [to] mak[e] sure that reason, rather than 
emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen 
developments in the courtroom.’” Id. The 9th Circuit stated that it “can 
discern no reason” to interpret the IDEA differently from § 1988. Id. at 
1091. The court opined that, like a pro se attorney, a parent appearing on 
behalf of a child in court proceedings would likely be emotionally 
charged and unable to provide adequate representation. Id. Therefore, 
parents should be encouraged to hire independent counsel who would be 
“emotionally neutral” and could better represent the child’s interests. Id. 
CONCLUSION: Th court found that because the “better rule” is to 
encourage parents to seek independent counsel for their child as opposed 
to representing the child themselves, a parent performing legal services 
on behalf of a child is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under the IDEA. Id. 
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TENTH CIRCUIT 
 
High Country Citizens Alliance v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether the APA [Administrative Procedures Act, 5 
U.S.C. §§ 701-706] waives sovereign immunity for Plaintiffs, who claim 
no adverse interest in the land, to bring a suit challenging the issuance of 
a patent under the 1872 Mining Law.” Id. at 1180. 
ANALYSIS: The court ruled that “[p]laintiffs can only sue the BLM 
[Bureau of Land Management] to the extent it waived its sovereign 
immunity.” Id. at 1181. The 10th Circuit found that the “APA serves as a 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity . . . the APA withdraws that 
waiver of sovereign immunity, however, when the relevant statute, in 
this case the 1872 Mining Law, ‘precludes judicial review.’” Id. The 
court determined that since the plaintiffs did not have any “competing 
interest in the land, [they] have no right of action to challenge the 
issuance of a patent.” Id. at 1188. The court stated that certainly “in 1872 
Congress was concerned with finality of title. Permitting a challenge by 
third parties with no interest in the land would allow the kind of lengthy 
litigation over rights that a patent was designed to avoid . . . and frustrate 
the purpose of the 1872 Mining Law.” Id. at 1185. 
CONCLUSION: “Despite the presumption of reviewability, it is 
fairly discernable here . . . that Congress, . . . intended to preclude 
judicial review to third parties claiming no property interest in the 
patented land and . . . [a]s such, we find that the Plaintiffs have no 
federal right of action against the BLM.” Id. at 1192. 
 
United States v. Laughrin, 438 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a district court committed error when it 
applied § 2K2.1(b)(4) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, [at 
that time requiring] a two-level increase in the sentence if the firearm at 
issue “was stolen, or had an altered or obliterated serial number.” Id. at 
1245. 
ANALYSIS: The court followed the 2nd and 9th Circuits in holding 
that the plain language of the sentencing guideline in question prohibited 
its application “when the defendant possessed a weapon that had never 
borne a serial number.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: Since the defendant’s shotgun never had a serial 
number, the court held the weapon was thus impossible to alter or 
obliterate, and concluded that the district court erred in applying the 
enhanced sentence to the defendant. Id. 
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McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether the Social Security Act (“SSA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
406(b)(1), allows the district court to award attorney’s fees to claimant’s 
counsel when the court remands a Title II Social Security disability case  
. . . and the Commissioner ultimately determines that the claimant is 
entitled to an award of past-due benefits.” Id. at 495-96. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that “[w]ithout the assistance of 
counsel in resorting to the court below claimant would have been 
deprived of the benefits which had been denied repeatedly by the 
[Commissioner].” Id. at 499. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “§ 406(b)(1) allows a district 
court to award attorneys’ fees in conjunction with a remand for further 
proceedings; it is not required, as a predicate to a § 406(b)(1) fee award, 
that the district court remand for an award of benefits.” Id. at 503. 
 
United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether a sentence that is extremely light when 
compared to the applicable advisory guidelines range [is] reasonable.” 
Id. at 591. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the sentencing guidelines “are 
an expression of popular political will about sentencing that is entitled to 
due consideration” when determining reasonableness. Id. at 593. The 
court explained that the greater the divergence from these guidelines, 
which are “the best estimate of Congress’s conception of 
reasonableness,” the more compelling the reasons for departure must be. 
Id. at 594. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that an actual sentence should only 
be treated as reasonable “if the facts of the case are dramatic enough to 
justify such a divergence from the politically-derived guideline range.” 
Id. at 594-95. 
 
Honeyville Grain v. NLRB, 444 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Hearing Officer and Board correctly . . . 
place[d] the preliminary burden of persuasion on [petitioner] to 
demonstrate that the religious remarks were inflammatory or the core 
of the Union’s campaign.” Id. at 1274. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that the appellate courts are in 
agreement that “a party challenging a representative election [must] . . . 
demonstrate that . . . religious remarks were inflammatory or formed the 
core of the campaign. Id. at 1275. The court noted that “[i]f this burden is 
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satisfied, the burden then shifts to the party making the remarks to prove 
that such comments were ‘truthful and germane,’ . . . [r]emarks not found 
to be inflammatory or the core or theme of the campaign are [then] 
reviewed under standards applied to other types of misrepresentations.” 
Id. 
CONCLUSION: “The party challenging an election on the basis of 
pre-election religious comments must initially show that the remarks 
were either inflammatory or formed the core or theme of the campaign.” 
Id. at 1279.  
 
United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the domestic relationship component of [18 
U.S.C.] § 922(g)(9) need be an element of the predicate misdemeanor 
offense.” Id. at 1049. 
ANALYSIS: The court observed that nine other circuits have dealt 
with this precise question, and have found that the domestic relationship 
component need not be an element of the predicate offense. Id. Section 
922(g)(a) “makes it unlawful for any person previously convicted of a 
‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence’ to possess a firearm.” Id. The 
court recited the definition of “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.” Id. 
The court also incorporated the reasoning of the 1st, 8th, and 9th 
Circuits, who have held that “use of the singular noun ‘element’ is 
indicative that the misdemeanor offense only requires one element, 
namely, the use of force.” Id. at 1050. The court was further persuaded 
that to rule otherwise would frustrate Congress’s attempt “to remedy the 
disparate treatment nationwide between those persons convicted of a 
felony involving domestic assault, who were prohibited from possessing 
a firearm, and those persons convicted of a misdemeanor involving 
domestic assault, who were not.” Id. at 1051. 
CONCLUSION: To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9), the predicate misdemeanor crime need not have a domestic 
relationship component as an element of the crime. Id. at 1049. 
 
In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the corporation waived its rights to attorney-
client privilege and work-product doctrine by disclosing privileged 
materials to federal agencies in the course of an investigation of the 
corporation. Id. at 1181. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit determined that case law in the circuit 
supports the finding that the disclosure of documents privileged under 
the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine will result in 
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the waiver of these doctrines. Id. at 1186. The court rejected Qwest’s 
argument and declined to adopt a selective waiver doctrine as an 
exception to the general waiver rules. Id. at 1192. In so holding, the court 
found that the majority of other circuits that examined the issue of 
selective waiver had likewise declined to apply it. Id. at 1187. Further, 
the court determined that selective waiver was unwarranted in this case 
because the agreements under which the privileged documents had been 
disclosed did little to prevent the government from further disclosures. 
Id. at 1192. 
CONCLUSION: Because the court declined to adopt selective waiver 
in this case, the disclosure of the privileged documents to federal 
agencies effectively waived the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine. Id. 
 
United States v. Pettigrew, 455 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether a pre-warning confession, not itself a 
violation of Miranda, but obtained subsequent to two violations of 
Miranda, must be suppressed.” Id. at 1170-71. 
ANALYSIS: First, the court addressed the “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” doctrine and found that, although the doctrine is broad and 
relatively strict when applied to Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
cases, it is more forgiving when applied to Fifth Amendment Miranda 
issues. Id. at 1171-72. Stressing Miranda’s dual purposes of assuring 
trustworthy evidence and deterring improper police conduct, the court 
relied on the Supreme Court’s determination in Elstad which requires 
suppression when confessions are obtained without a warning and in 
violation of Miranda. Id. at 1172.  The court noted, however, that “it 
does not necessarily follow that every subsequent voluntary statement     
. . . must be suppressed as well.” Id. Once the court concluded that the 
defendant’s statement was not automatically excluded by the “fruits” 
doctrine, it then determined whether the statement was voluntary, by 
viewing the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1173-74. The test, 
supplied in Lopez, “is whether the confession is the product of an 
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” Id. at 1174. 
Using this standard, the court found that there was no coercion by the 
police to obtain the defendant’s statement. Id. Thus, the conduct was 
“unconstrained.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that a pre-warning confession 
obtained subsequent to two violations of Miranda need not be 
suppressed. Id. 
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United States v. Sanders, 449 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “verbal threats, made while the firearms were 
not in the immediate possession of the [d]efendant, are sufficient to 
convert the purpose of the firearms to something other than lawful 
sporting purposes” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines § 
2K2.1(b)(2). Id. at 1089. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that under § 2K2.1(b)(2), “it is the 
defendant’s burden to show . . . that [he] ‘possessed all ammunition and 
firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection.’” Id. at 1090. 
The court found that defendant “repeatedly stated that he intended to 
shoot someone with his firearms” and “it would be reasonable to infer 
that he actually meant to use the rifles for such a purpose, or, if not to fire 
them, to coerce others by instilling fear that he would fire them.” Id. The 
court determined that although defendant had “obtained the rifles for 
hunting and that had been their sole prior use,” that the district court 
could properly find that “[he] had acquired the new purpose for 
possessing the firearms of using them to coerce and injure people.” Id. 
The court further noted “[o]ne can have a purpose for possessing a 
firearm before actually using the firearm for that purpose.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit rejected defendant’s argument and 
held that “the district court could properly decline to apply the guideline 
on the ground that [defendant] had threatened to shoot various persons 
with a firearm, even though he was not carrying a firearm when he made 
the threats.” Id. at 1088. 
 
Dulworth v. Evans, 442 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)’s one-year limitation 
period applies to § 2241 habeas petitions contesting administrative 
decisions.” Id. at 1267. 
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit found that although the language of “§ 
2244(d)(1)’s one-year limitations period applies to all habeas petitions 
filed by persons in ‘custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,’    
. . . [the court extended its scope such that] even if the petition challenges 
a pertinent administrative decision rather than a state court judgment, the 
limitation period applies.” Id. at 1268. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that where a person in custody 
“timely and diligently exhausts his administrative remedies, § 
2244(d)(1)(D)’s one-year limitation period does not commence until the 
decision rejecting his administrative appeal becomes final.” Id. at 1268. 
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Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., 462 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a principal shareholder of various automobile 
dealerships’ parent company “qualifies as a dealer [under the 
Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. 1221, (“ADDCA”)] 
and is therefore authorized to sue under the statute.” Id. at 1239. 
ANALYSIS: The court first looked to § 1222 of the ADDCA, 
starting with  which provides that “[a]n automobile dealer may bring suit 
against any automobile manufacturer . . . by reason of the failure of said 
automobile manufacturer . . . to act in good faith in performing or 
complying with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in 
terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise with said dealer.” 
Id. The court looked at the statutory definitions under the ADDCA, and 
the court then determined that the appellant lacked standing under the 
ADDCA because he conceded he was not “a party to a franchise 
agreement” with the manufacturer. Id. Appellant asked the court to 
interpret the ADDCA to “confer standing on shareholder/operators in 
certain circumstances” and to “carve out an exception . . . because his 
personal economic interests are ‘inextricably woven’ into [the 
companies’] corporate interests.” Id.  
Rejecting appellant’s requests, the court distinguished Kavanaugh 
v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710 (7th Cir. 1965) because here the 
manufacturer did not control appellant’s corporations. Id. The court also 
distinguished York Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 
447 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1971) because here, the appellant did not have a 
unique relationship with the manufacturer. Id. at 1240. The court then 
noted that “most other circuits have expressly refused to carve out 
exceptions to the ADDCA.” Id. at 1241. The court then stated, “[w]here 
a statute is unambiguous on its face, the court need not inquire further.” 
Id. Noting that appellant did not argue to pierce the corporate veil, the 
court observed, “where parties choose the corporate form and receive all 
the benefits that flow from that structure, we should be hesitant to ignore 
the consequences.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that the ADDCA does not 
confer standing to those who do not qualify as “dealers” under the plain 
language of the Act. Id 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
 
Int’l Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 456 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: What is “the appropriate legal standard for good faith 
with respect to a fair-use defense” when the defense is raised in response 
to allegations of trademark infringement. Id. at 1271. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that other circuits found that 
“the standard for good faith for fair-use is the same as the legal standard 
for good faith in any other trademark infringement context [which] asks 
whether the alleged infringer intended to trade on the goodwill of the 
trademark owner by creating confusion as to the source of the goods or 
services.” Id. at 1274. The court found that where the “use of the mark 
[is] the ‘only [symbol] reasonably available’ to indicate that the image on 
the card is meant to be a postage stamp, [its use] does not attempt to 
capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet’ of the 
mark holder” and the alleged infringer is deemed to have acted in good 
faith. Id. at 1277. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that there was “no evidence in 
the record to support the allegation that the [defendant] . . . intended to 
benefit from the good will associated with [the] . . . trademark” and 
concluded that the alleged infringer could raise the fair-use defense since 
it acted in good faith. Id. 
 
United States v. Aguilar-Ortiz, 450 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether solicitation constitutes a drug trafficking 
offense for purposes of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B).” 
Id. at 1272. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that a conviction could be based on 
soliciting a large quantity of narcotics for redistribution or, alternatively, 
on a very small amount for personal use. Id. at 1275. The court could not 
say “as a categorical matter that all solicitation offenses under Florida 
law qualify as drug trafficking offenses,” but instead provided guidance 
in stating that a “defendant’s prior conviction for solicitation of the 
delivery of drugs” may constitute a drug trafficking offense when the 
court finds substantial evidence “that the defendant manufactured, 
imported, exported, distributed, or dispensed of a controlled (or 
counterfeit) substance, or possessed a substance with the intent to 
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense it.” Id. at 1276. 
CONCLUSION: The court held that “whether a solicitation offense 
under Florida law qualifies as a drug trafficking offense . . . depends on 
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the facts of the case,” looking at factors such as quantity and intent. Id. at 
1275. 
 
Martinez v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) restores [the 
Court’s] ability to review the [Board of Immigration’s (the “BIA”)] 
purely discretionary determination that a petitioner failed to satisfy § 
1229b(b)(1)(D)’s ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ 
requirement.” Id. at 1221. 
ANALYSIS: The court recalled its earlier ruling that it lacks 
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s § 1229b(b)(1)(D) discretionary 
determinations whether to cancel the removal of an alien upon a showing 
of, “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Id. The court returned 
to the issue, however, to determine the impact of an amendment to § 
1229b(b)(1)(D), which provides that certain provisions related to the 
same “shall [not] be construed as precluding review of constitutional 
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review.” Id. The 
court then adopted the position taken in similar decision on the impact of 
the amendment, in which the court held that the “BIA’s ‘discretionary or 
factual determinations continue to fall outside [the Court’s] jurisdiction.” 
Id. at 1222. In closing, the court noted that this position paralleled rulings 
in the 2nd, 7th, 8th and 9th Circuits. Id.           
CONCLUSION: “Notwithstanding Congress’s enactment of § 
1252(a)(2)(D), [the court] continue[s] to lack jurisdiction over the BIA’s 
purely discretionary decision that a petitioner did not meet § 
1229b(b)(1)(D)’s ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ 
standard.” Id. at 1222-23. 
 
United States v. Nix, 438 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a person convicted and sentenced to more 
than one year for a federal crime violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), “which 
makes it a crime for any person to possess a firearm,” if the defendant 
never lost his rights under state law. Id. at 1284-85. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) provides an 
exception to § 922(g)(1) when “the defendant has had his civil rights 
restored, unless the restoration expressly restricts the defendant’s firearm 
rights.” Id. at 1284. Here, the court explained that the prior conviction 
“[had] not been expunged or set aside, [the defendant] has not been 
pardoned for it, and the civil rights . . . lost under state law as a result of 
the conviction have not been restored.” Id. at 1286. The court held that 
the provision’s “unless” clause “serves only to exclude from the 
exception pardons, expungements, and restorations that expressly limit a 
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convicted felon’s firearms rights.” Id. The court noted that it does not 
apply if the felon was convicted under federal law and “never lost his 
firearm rights under state law to begin with.” Id. The court observed that 
“[t]o accept [the defendant’s] argument we would have to transform a 
clause that limits an exception into one that enlarges the exception.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that defendants are not 
protected by the “unless clause” of § 922(a)(20) if they were convicted 
under federal law and never lost the right to carry a firearm under state 
law. Id. 
 
United States v. Norris, 452 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the “market value” of an offense under 
U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1 should be based on the entire contents of the shipment 
or only on that portion of the shipment that was undocumented. Id. at 
1280. 
ANALYSIS: Because no case law discusses this issue, the 11th 
Circuit looked to the “principle of general applicability” for the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines, § 1B1.3. Id. at 1281. Under this provision, 
the specific offense characteristics may be determined from any acts and 
omissions committed by the defendant “that occurred during the 
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, 
or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that 
offense.” Id. The court found evidence that defendant strategically 
packaged shipments so that small amounts of undocumented orchids 
were mixed with large amounts of documented orchids and that the 
shipments were packaged so that the documented orchids appeared at the 
top when inspected by customs agents to conceal the undocumented 
orchids below. Id. at 1281-82. Also, the court found that defendant used 
“false and misleading” customs documentation to smuggle the 
undocumented orchids. Id. at 1282. 
CONCLUSION: Because defendant used the legally documented 
orchids to smuggle the undocumented orchids, the market value of the 
legally documented orchids is relevant to the commission of the crime 
and was properly considered in determining the defendant’s level of 
offense. Id. 
 
United States v. Wilk, 452 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether defendant was provided sufficient notice of 
the government’s decision to seek the death penalty against him under 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(a). Id. at 1210. 
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit stated that § 3593(a) requires that the 
government provide notice to a defendant of its decision to seek the 
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death penalty “a reasonable time before the trial.” Id. at 1221. The court 
determined that the applicable standard to ascertain what constitutes a 
“reasonable time” under the statute is objective reasonableness under the 
totality of the circumstances. Id. Applying this standard, the court found 
that the parties were aware that the case was likely to be a death penalty 
case and that defendant’s counsel began preparing for a death penalty 
case before the notice was even provided. Id. at 1222. Further, there was 
a span of six months between the issuing of the notice to defendant and 
the beginning of the trial. Id. The court opined that six months was 
sufficiently “reasonable” under the circumstances of this case. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The government provided the defendant with 
objectively reasonable notice under § 3593(a), so defendant’s motion to 
strike the death notice was properly denied. Id. at 1225. 
 
United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Booker rendered the eligibility requirements for safety-valve 
relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), U.S.S.G. §§ 5C1.2 & 4A1.1 advisory or 
otherwise permitted courts discretion as to the imposition of mandatory 
minimum sentences.” Id. at 1292. 
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that “even 
after Booker, district courts remain obligated to correctly calculate the 
guideline range pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1).” Id. at 1300. The 
court also recognized that “to treat calculation of the safety-valve 
eligibility criteria as advisory would, in effect, excise 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(f)(1).” Id. 
CONCLUSION: “[T]he district court did not err when it determined 
that Booker did not permit a court to discretion to grant relief from the 
mandatory minimum sentence.” Id. 
 
Evans v. Walter Indus., 449 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Who, under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 
bears the burden of proving the local controversy exception to federal 
court jurisdiction. Id. at 1164. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[u]nder CAFA, federal courts 
now have original jurisdiction over class actions in which the amount in 
controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and there is minimal diversity (at least 
one plaintiff and one defendant are from different states).”  Id. at 1163.  
However, the court noted that the statute does carve out “an exception to 
federal jurisdiction for cases that are truly local in nature.” Id.. The court 
found the case to be analogous to three other decisions, one by the 
Supreme Court, and two by the 11th Circuit, which dealt with similar 
2006] First Impressions 185 
situations governed by similar federal statutes containing exception 
provisions, and which all held that once the prerequisites for removal to 
federal court had been met, the party objecting to removal to federal 
court had the burden of proving that the exception should apply. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court referenced those decisions, and “h[e]ld 
that the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving the local controversy 
exception to the jurisdiction otherwise established.” Id. at 1165. 
 
Burlison v. McDonald’s Corp., 455 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: What do subsections (i) and (ii) of 29 U.S.C. § 
626(f)(1)(H), the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”), 
require of employers who seek “waivers in connection with group 
terminations.” Id. at 1245. 
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) for guidance on this issue. Id. at 
1246. The court determined that “reading these clauses separately fails to 
apply the EEOC’s regulation concerning the appropriate scope of the 
program, which . . . is determined by examining the ‘decisional unit’ at 
issue.” Id. The court determined that “[n]othing in the regulations 
supports parsing the statute to apply a decisional-unit scope to a portion 
of subsection (ii) while applying a national scope to the other portion of 
that subsection.” Id. at 1247. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit found that the OWBPA is 
ambiguous and held that “the OWBPA’s informational requirements are 
limited to the decisional unit that applies to the discharged employees.” 
Id. 
 
Bracewell v. Kelley, 454 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether a crop disaster payment “is property of the 
bankruptcy estate under [11 U.S.C.] § 541(a)(1).” Id. at 1237. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “the plain language of that 
provision . . . makes the commencement of the bankruptcy case the key 
date for property definition purposes. That means the property of the 
debtor’s estate is property the debtor had when the bankruptcy case 
commences, not property he acquires thereafter. Id. The court noted that 
its “most closely analogous decision, as well as the only two courts of 
appeals decisions that are directly on point, confirm that the clear 
temporal limitation which is so plain on the face of the statutory 
language controls.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit sided with the 5th and 9th Circuits 
in finding that there is no interest that can be included at the time of 
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Bankruptcy if it is a payment that Congress has not yet authorized. Id. at 
1239. 
 
De Sandoval v. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276 (11th  Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether “the Attorney General exceeded his authority 
in promulgating 8 C.F.R. § 241.8, which empowers an immigration 
officer, rather than an immigration judge, to reinstate the previous 
removal order of an alien who illegally reenters the United States;” and 
whether “[section] 1231(a)(5) is impermissibly retroactive as applied to 
her, even though she illegally reentered the United States after that 
statute took effect; [and if] she is not subject to § 1231(a)(5) because that 
section conflicts with and was superseded by § 1255(i) . . . .” Id. at 1276. 
ANALYSIS: The court found § 1229a(a) and § 1231(a)(5) 
ambiguous regarding the procedures for reinstating an existing removal 
order, and joined the 1st and 8th Circuits in holding that the Attorney 
General’s interpretation of these statutes under 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 was 
permissible, thus denying the petitioner a hearing before an immigration 
judge. Id. at 1285. The court used the fact that the petitioner illegally 
reentered the United States after the applicable statute’s effective date to 
apply § 1231(a)(5) to the petitioner. Id. The court did not find that § 
1255(i) either conflicted or superseded § 1231(a)(5); therefore it used § 
1231(a)(5) to bar the petitioner from seeking an adjustment of status. Id. 
Finally, Petitioner failed to show that alleged procedural errors caused 
her substantial prejudice, so her procedural due process challenge to 8 
C.F.R. § 241.8 failed. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit held that each of the petitioner’s 
claims lacked merit. Id. at 1285. 
 
Esponda v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the failure to submit a supplementary brief 
would alone justify summary dismissal even in cases where petitioners 
adequately set out the basis for their appeal on the Notice of Appeal” on 
an appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying them asylum. Id. at 
1321. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b) states that 
“[a] party taking the appeal must identify the reasons for the appeal in 
the Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26 or Form EOIR-29) or in any 
attachments thereto, in order to avoid summary dismissal pursuant to § 
1003.1(d)(2)(i).” Id. at 1322. Accordingly, the court noted that an appeal 
will not be summarily dismissed if a petitioner complies by identifying 
the reason for the appeal, even if on the Notice of Appeal itself. Id. 
2006] First Impressions 187 
CONCLUSION: The court ruled with the 4th and 9th Circuits, and 
contrary to the 5th Circuit, that summarily dismissing an appeal when the 
reason for the appeal is included on the Notice of Appeal is an abuse of 
discretion. Id. 
 
Ugokwe v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether, under [the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act] the BIA’s [Board of Immigration 
Appeals] failure to rule on a petitioner’s motion to reopen, filed prior to 
the expiration of her voluntary departure period, authorizes the BIA to 
decline to rule on the merits of the motion to reopen.” Id. at 1329. 
ANALYSIS: The court sided with the 9th Circuit’s analysis of the 
relevant statute, saying the statute does not “establish a time by which 
the BIA must make its decision regarding a motion to reopen.” Id. 
Accordingly, denying a ruling on the merits based on the timing of the 
BIA decision would deny the alien a statutory right. Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit decided to “adopt the rule . . . that 
the timely filing of a motion to reopen tolls the period of voluntary 
departure pending the resolution of the motion to reopen.” Id. at 1331. 
 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 
2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the failure of the Secretary . . . of the 
Interior to perform the nondiscretionary duty to designate a critical 
habitat for a threatened species is a continuing violation that permits a 
plaintiff to file suit more than six years after the deadline to perform that 
duty has passed.” Id. at 1333. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that “the continuing violation doctrine 
permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when 
additional violations of the law occur within the statutory period.” Id. at 
1334. Further, the court found that the violation committed was the 
failure to meet the deadline, which occurred at the moment the deadline 
passed and did not re-occur. Id. at 1335. Finally, the court had previously 
“limited the application of the continuing violation doctrine to situations 
in which a reasonably prudent plaintiff would have been unable to 
determine that a violation had occurred.” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The court ruled that the continuing violation 
doctrine did not apply and the statute of limitations was not tolled. Id. at 
1336. 
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MCI WorldCom Commc’ns., Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 446 
F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether the regulations promulgated by the FCC 
pursuant to the Telecommunications Act allow the use of multiple 
scenarios in compliance with the Total Element Long-Run Incremental 
Cost Method (“TELRIC”)—the FCC’s rate setting methodology. Id. at 
1172. 
ANALYSIS: The court found that TELRIC necessitated the 
calculation of “the per unit cost of an unbundled network element be 
calculated by finding the total cost for the element in a hypothetical most 
efficient network and dividing by the number of units that will be put 
into use by the incumbent or a competitive local carrier.” Id. at 1173. The 
defendants argued, and the court agreed, that “no single scenario for wire 
loops can be ‘most efficient’ because different services require different 
types of wire loops . . . [t]he use of multiple scenarios classifies different 
types of wire loops as different network elements.” Id. at 1173. 
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that TELRIC allows “an 
incumbent local carrier to define its unbundled network elements 
narrowly to separate wire loops with different capabilities and 
characteristics into different network elements through the use of 
multiple scenarios.” Id. at 1174. 
 
Vuksanovic v. Att’y Gen., 439 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “Whether second-degree arson involves moral 
turpitude.” Id. at 1311. 
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that it “has no jurisdiction to 
review a final order of removal if the alien is inadmissible or removable 
by reason of having committed a crime involving moral turpitude for 
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.” Id. at 1310. 
The court further noted that “the determination that a crime involves 
moral turpitude is made categorically based on the statutory definition or 
nature of the crime, not the specific conduct predicating a particular 
conviction.” Id. at 1311. 
CONCLUSION: The court found that the proscribed behavior, 
“willful destruction of a structure by fire or explosion without a lawful, 
legitimate purpose—evinces a certain baseness in the private and social 
duties a man owes to society and is ‘contrary to the accepted and 
customary rule of right and duty between man and man.’” Id. Therefore, 
the 11th Circuit held that a conviction for second-degree arson under 
Florida law was a crime involving moral turpitude, and the court did not 
have jurisdiction to review the final order of removal. Id. at 1312. 
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Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: Whether section 657 of Title IV-D creates “a private 
right, enforceable under § 1983, to distribution of . . . payments in strict 
compliance with § 657.” Id. at 1342. 
ANALYSIS: The court stated that in order to whether Congress 
meant to confer a benefit on plaintiffs under the statute, it “must weigh 
three factors: ‘whether the statute (1) contains ‘rights-creating’ language 
that is individually focused; (2) addresses the needs of individual persons 
being satisfied instead of having a systemwide or aggregate focus; and 
(3) lacks an enforcement mechanism through which an aggrieved 
individual can obtain review.’” Id. at 1344. 
The court found that “§ 657 does not contain individually focused, 
rights-creating language under the first Gonzaga factor.” Id. at 1345. 
Further, the court found that “§ 657 has a systemwide or aggregate, 
rather than individual, focus under, the second Gonzaga factor.” Id. at 
1347. And although “§ 657 lacks a remedial scheme sufficiently 
comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the 
remedy of suits under § 1983[,] . . . [t]he other two factors counsel in 
favor of finding Congress did not ‘[speak] with a clear voice to 
unambiguously manifest its intent to create enforceable rights.’” Id. 
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit held that “§ 657 does not confer a 
private right to distribution of child support payments enforceable under 
§ 1983.” Id. 
 
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. United States, 455 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) 
QUESTION: “[W]hether the statute of limitations period set forth in 
26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) applies to claims for refunds made by those who 
have mistakenly filed a return and paid tax when they were not actually 
required to file a tax return.” Id. at 1262. 
ANALYSIS: Since the term “the taxpayer” could have more than one 
meaning in this section of the statute, the court looked at the term in the 
context of the entire statute. Id. The court also found that “[a]nd reading 
“the taxpayer” as a reference to taxpayers generally makes more sense in 
light of the rest of the Tax Code, producing a more harmonious result.” 
Id. at 1268. 
CONCLUSION: “Because Wachovia failed to file its claims for a 
refund for the 1997 and 1998 tax years within the three-year limitations 
period set forth in 26 U.S.C. 6511(a), the district court was barred by 26 
U.S.C. § 7422(a) from exercising any jurisdiction over those claims.” Id. 
at 1269. 
